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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

WILLIAM WOLFE,
Petitioner,
VS.

)
)
)
)
)

.,,,.

CASE NO. CR 18290
MOTION TO SUBMIT
BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL
IDAHO JURISDICTIONAL
ALLIANCE, AMICUS CURIAE,
LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE IDAHO COUNTY
PROSECUTOR
f~,

)

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

A.
The North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance (Alliance), a group of
governmental entities interested in jurisdictional issues within the 1863 reservation
,

,

boundary, hereby moves to submit a brief, amicus curiae, limited in scope, to address the
reservation disestablishment issue in support of the position of the Idaho County Special
Prosecutor.

MOTION TO SUBMIT BRIEF
BY NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE
- 1-
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This brief is submitted in the event the court should address the diminishment or
disestablishment of the Nez Perce Reservation.
The Alliance is an unincorporated association; its members include 2 counties, 9
cities, 3 school districts and 7 highway districts in north central Idaho, whose
geographical boundaries include land which was within the Nez Perce Indian reservation
as it existed prior to 1894. This area is now ninety percent (90%) owned and populated
by non-members of the Nez Perce Tribe.
The purpose of the Alliance is to provide an organization to foster cooperation
between its members and to focus their efforts toward obtaining a resolution of their
jurisdictional authority in relationship to the jurisdictional authority of the United States
and the Nez Perce Tribe.
B.

The amicus curiae submits that the arguments of the Special Prosecutor in
opposition to the petition for post conviction relief are compelling. In the event this court
disagrees with that position, this amicus curiae brief concludes that the original
reservation has been diminished.

That diminishment also supports the position of the

Idaho County Special Prosecutor. The jurisdiction of the State of Idaho in this case is
clear.
This amicus curiae brief supports the decision of Judge Barry Wood in the Snake
River Basin Adjudication. Judge Wood held that the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was
disestablished by an act of Congress.

MOTION TO SUBMIT BRIEF
BY NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE
-2-
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Respectfully submitted this 31 st day of August 2006.

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to
Submit Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance, Amicus Curiae, Limited in
Scope, in Support of the Idaho County Prosecutor was served on August 31, 2006, by
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following named persons at their
respective post office addresses as follows:
William Wolfe
Inmate #18593
ICCHCllB
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

Jeff P. Payne
Idaho County Prosecutor
114 South Idaho
Grangeville, ID 83530

Brit Groom
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 227
Cottonwood, ID 83522

Michael E. McNichols

MOTION TO SUBMIT BRIEF
BY NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

7

8

9

STATE OF IDAHO,

10
11

Plaintiff,
VS.

12
WILLIAM WOLFE,
13

14

Defendant.

)
) Case No. CR 18290
)
)
) MOTION FOR CHANGE OF
) SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
)
)
)
)
)

15
COMES NOW, Jeff P. Payne, Special Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County in the above

16
entitled matter, and moves the Court to order that Jeff P. Payne be relieved of the duties of special

17
prosecutor in this matter and that another special prosecutor be appointed, ifnecessary, to prosecute
18
any further matters that may arise in this matter.
19
The defendant in this matter is currently in the custody of the Idaho Department of
20
Corrections. There are no prosecutorial matters currently pending, however, as the defendant is
21
currently in the custody ofthe Idaho Department of Corrections on this matter, there is the potential

22
that matters requiring prosecution or prosecutorial decisions could occur in the future.

23
I will be unable to continue to serve as a special prosecutor in this matter after August 31,

24
2007.

25
DATED this / C,,ti)day of August, 2007.

26
27
28

MOTION FOR CHANGE
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
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1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
5
6
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The undersigned hereby certifies that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document
was served upon the following person(s) in the
manner indicated below on the-'-"-'--'--'- day
of August, 2007:

8
9
10

Jonathon D. Hallin
Wilcox & Hallin, PLLC
200 Part Street
P.O. Box 947
McCall, ID 83638

U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
)< Courthouse Tray
Via Facsimile

11

12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24

25

26
27
28

MOTION FOR CHANGE
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
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Attorney for: Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

6

7

8

STATE OF IDAHO,

9
10

Plaintiff,
VS.

11
12

WILLIAM WOLFE,

13

Defendant.

)
) Case No. CR 18290
)
)
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION
) FOR CHANGE OF SPECIAL
) PROSECUTOR
)
)
)
)

14

Having considered Jeff P. Payne's motion for change of special prosecutor in the above-

15
entitled and numbered mater, and good cause appearing therefore;
16

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Jeff P. Payne's motion for change of special prosecutor be
17
granted, and Jeff P. Payne is relieved of the duties of special prosecutor in the above-entitled and
18
numbered matter.
19
20
21
Dfatrict Judge
22
23

24
25

26
27
28

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
CHA-N'GE OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
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Jonathon D. Hallin
Wilcox & Hallin, PLLC
200 Part Street
P.O. Box 947
McCall, ID 83638
Jeff P. Payne
Attorney at Law
114 South Idaho
Grangeville, ID 83430

U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered c/ Courthouse Tray
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT-~
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
William Wolfe
Petitioner

Case No. CR-1982-18290

vs

Motion to Notice Hearing
Request for Judicial Notice

People State of Idaho
Respondent

Comes now the petitioner, William Wolfe Pro-se, respectfully moves this court,
court ~lerk to Notice this action for hearing in the above captioned criminal
action Rule 35 Motion to Reconsider.
( 1) Rule 35 reconsider petition has been ripe before this court for ruling
since 2004-2005.
( 2) Petitioner requests this Court to take Judicial Notice of the files and
records contained in the records of both t.he criminal action and the Post
Conviction action, Case No. CV-2005-36455.
( 3) Request for Judicial Notice is made pursuant to provisions of rules of
evidence, rule 201.
(4) Petitioner request hearing date in this action/or ruling at the Courts
earliest convenience.
Where for the Petitioner prays this Court Grant this motion and any other
relief it deems appropriate.
Date: 4-21-2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I William Wolfe do swear by my affixed signature that I sent a true and
correct copies of the Motion of Notice Hearing to the Prosecuter at the
address below and the Original to the Court clerk.
Clerk of the Court
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main
Grangeville ID. 93530

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main
Grangeville ID. 93530

Sent via U.S.P.S~ on the 21 day of April 2011 .•
~
,

So Sworn
Motion to Notice Hearing pg-1

~

?G/4~~~
William Wolfe

William Wolfe
I.D.O.C. #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707
In Pro-se
\;
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT_,bF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
William Wolfe
Petitioner

V.
People State of Idaho
Respondent

Case No. CR-1982-18290
Motion for Judicial Notice of New
Idaho State Supreme Court Opinion
In Support of Motion to Reconsider
I.C.R. 35 Motion

I William Wolfe hereby plead with this Court to take Judicial Notice of a
new Idaho State Supreme Court Opinion in support of my Motion to Reconsider
I.C.R. 35 motion.
I have just received a copy of a new opinion from the Idaho State Supreme
Court, State of Idaho V. Daniel Francis Lute, Docket No. 37394, 2011 opinion
No. 50, Field: April 20, 2011. ( I have attached a copy of this ruling for
your convenince.)
My case and the Lute case are very much the same, in that both cases
where brought up in a I.C.R. 35 Motion and the crux of both cases is
Jurisdiction. We must determine whether the District Court had Subject Matter
Jurisdiction to consider the charges filed against Wolfe when the Grand Jury
that indicted him was acting without legal authority.
My case and State V. Lute are also aJ.ike in that the state argued that
Lute's case was moot because Lute brought his I.C.R. 35 motion over fourteen
years after his five year sentence was intered. In my case the State is also
contending that I am time barred, when in fact Idaho Rule 35 Allow's a trial
court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. As it did in State V. Lute.
Id. As a general matter, it is a question of Law as to whether a sentence is
illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion, and the Court exercises free
review over question of law. Id. Jurisdiction is like wise a question of law
and is reviewed de novo. State V. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095,
1097 (1998). Which pertains to the Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a
general type of class of dispute. " Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158,
P.3d 305, 308 (2007). The source of this power comes from Article V, Section
20, of the Idhao Constitution, which provides that district courts "shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such
appellate jurisdiction as my be conferred by law." This issue is so
fundamental to the propriety of a court's actions, that subject matter
jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to, and a court has a sua sponte
duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case.
Motion for Judicial Notice. P-1.

' ,,_.-)..,
Uuu
. ,G ':Ju

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4). Furthermore, judgments and orders made without
subject matter jurisdiction are void and "are subject to collateral attack,
and are not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v.
Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27 1 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-1071 (1978). This Court
exercises free review over questions of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Also request's this Court to take Judicial Notice of the files
and records contained in the records of both the criminal action and the Post
Conviction action1 Case No. CV-2005-36455.
I would like to plead with the Court to apply the State v. Lute opinion
as it apply's to my case.
Dated this

\

day of May, 2011.

William Wolfe
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \
day of May, 2011. I mailed a true and
correct copy of the attached Motion 'for Judicial Notice of New Idaho State
Supreme Court Opinion In Sipport of Motion to Reconsider I.C.R. 35 Motion, via
prison mail system for processing to the United States mail system, postage
prepaid, addressed to:
William Wolfe

Clerk of the Court
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main
Grangeville ID. 93530

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main
Grangeville ID. 93530

Motion for Judicial Notice. P-2.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket no. 37394
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
Boise, April ion Term
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
2011 Opinion No. 50
v.
)
)
Filed: April 20, 2011
DANIEL FRANCIS LUTE,
)
)
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
Defendant-Appellant.

________________

,)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofidaho, Ada
County. Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge.
District court denial of ICR 35 motion to correct illegal sentence, reversed.
Daniel Francis Lute, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

BURDICK, Justice
This case arises on appeal from the district court's denial of Daniel Lute's Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. Lute argues that the grand jury that indicted
him was acting without authority as its commission had expired and, therefore, the district court
had no subject matter jurisdiction over his case and could not properly enter a Judgment of
conviction. Lute further argues that the conviction underlying his sentence is for something that
is not a crime in Idaho and, as such, any sentence given for such conduct is necessarily illegal.
We reverse the district court's denial of Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion and remand with instructions to
grant the motion and vacate Lute's conviction, consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 6, 1993, a grand jury indicted Lute for the offense of "Battery with the Intent to
Commit a Serious Felony", specifically "rape and/or kidnapping." Following his arraignment,
Lute entered into a plea agreement with the State, under which Lute agreed to plead guilty and

1

the State agreed to amend the indictment to eliminate reference to "rape", with the resulting
charge reading "Battery with the Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, [to wit], Kidnapping, I.C. §
18-911." The judge used handwritten strike throughs to amend the indictment, eliminating any
reference to rape. A judgment of conviction was entered on August 17, 1993, sentencing Lute to
five years fixed, to run concurrently with a sentence that Lute was already serving.

The

judgment did not specify which serious felony Lute intended to commit when he committed
battery.
On August 30, 2007, approximately nine years after the expiration of Lute's sentence,
Lute filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for correction or reduction of sentence. Lute complained that the
records of the Idaho Department of Corrections showed that he had been convicted of a sex
crime, and requested that the judgment be amended to eliminate this confusion. The district
court granted Lute's request, 1 amending the judgment to read that Lute had been convicted for
"Battery with Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, to wit, Kidnapping, I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-91 I."
On January 29, 2008, Lute filed a second !.C.R. 35 motion, arguing that his sentence was
invalid because the crime he pled guilty to was not proscribed in the Idaho Code. Lute also
argued that the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction
when it entered the judgment, because the term of the grand jury had already expired at the time
he was indicted. The State acknowledged that the grand jury's term had expired at the time of
Lute's indictment, but argued that the defect was not jurisdictional and was waived by Lute when
he entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement and pled guilty to the amended indictment.
The district court denied Lute's January 29, 2008, motion, finding that a validly entered
guilty plea rendered the procedural defects in the grand jury indictment harmless, and no
jurisdictional defect existed. Lute appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Lute filed a
petition for review, which this Court granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court gives
due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the
decision of the trial court. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009).
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. Id. As a
general matter, it is a question of law as to whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an
1

It is unclear whether the district court amended the judgment on the basis ofI.C.R. 35 or I.C.R. 36.

2

illegal fashion, and this Court exercises free review over questions of law. Id. Jurisdiction is
likewise a question of law and is reviewed de nova. State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379,381, 957
P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998).

III. ANALYSIS
The crux of this appeal is jurisdiction. We must determine whether the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the charges filed against Lute when the grand jury that
indicted him was acting without legal authority. If we find that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the case initially, then this Court must determine whether the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by Lute under his I.C.R. 35
motion where Lute attacked the conviction itself, not merely the sentence.
A. Lute's appeal is not moot.
The State argues that Lute's appeal is moot because Lute brought his I.C.R. 35 motion
over fourteen years after his five year sentence was entered, and that sentence was fully
completed prior to his filing of the I.C.R. 35 motion. The State contends that I.C.R. 35 does not
grant the district court authority to grant relief for a sentence that has been served in its entirety.
Lute responds that it is well established under Idaho law that the completion of a sentence does
not make a felony conviction moot.
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is
capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Koch v. Canyon Cnty.,
145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008) (quotation omitted). In Butler v. State, 129 Idaho
899, 901, 935 P .2d 162, 164 (1997), this Court held that "a felony conviction has collateral
consequences and the fact that [an appellant] has fully served his sentence does not moot [that
appellant's] appeal." Abrogated on other grounds by Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, _, 233
P.3d 61, 68 (2010). This is in line with the United States Supreme Court's statement that "a
criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). The State has offered no such showing here.
The State contends that I.C.R. 35 grants courts the limited jurisdictional power to
consider whether a sentence is illegal, and where the sentence itself has been completed a court
is powerless to take any meaningful corrective action under I.C.R. 35-as the appellant will not
have his grievance addressed by any modification of that sentence. However, where there is a

3
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jurisdictional defect, this court has authority to address that issue, even if it is not raised by the
parties themselves.

State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003).

Furthem1ore, "[w ]here it is apparent from the record that the act the defendant was criminally
convicted for is not a crime according to the laws of the state, this Court has the authority to
vacate the convictions sua sponte . ... " Id. at 484, 80 P.3d at 1085.
"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend
or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time
for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79
P.3d 711, 714 (2003). However, where a court properly has jurisdiction to consider a case-as it
does here to consider Lute's !.C.R. 35 motion-and it is apparent that there is an issue
concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was convicted for something that is not
a crime, this Court must correct that error. See Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483-84, 80 P.3d at 1084-85.

B. The district court did not have jurisdiction to convict Lute when the grand jury that
indicted him was acting without authority.
Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution states, inter alia, "[n]o person shall be held
to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of
a grand jury or on information of the public'prosecutor .... " Under what was previously !.C.R.
6(j), and is now !.C.R. 6.8, "no grand jury shall serve more than six (6) months unless
specifically ordered by the court which summoned the grand jury." "An indictment issued by a
grand jury whose term is up and has not been validly extended is void .... " United States v.

Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1240 (7th Cir. 1990). As this Court stated in State v. Urrabazo:
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general
type or class of dispute." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308
(2007). The source of this power comes from Article V, Section 20, of the Idaho
Constitution, which provides that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in
all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be
conferred by law." This issue is so fundamental to the propriety of a court's
actions, that subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to, and a
court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a
case. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4). Furthermore, judgments and orders made
without subject matter jurisdiction are void and "are subject to collateral attack,
and are not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99
Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1978). This Court exercises free
review over questions of jurisdiction.

4
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150 Idaho 158, _, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248-49 (2010) (internal citations omitted).

"The

information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of
Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228,
91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004).
In State v. Dalling, a grand jury was convened on October 13, 1992, and that grand jury

lost its legal status as a body empowered to act as a grand jury six months later, on April 13,
1993, in accordance with I.C.R. 6.8. 128 Idaho 203, 204-05, 911 P.2d 1115, 1116-17 (1996).
Nevertheless, the grand jury continued to meet after April 13, and was not officially discharged
until May 7, 1993. Id. at 204, 911 P.2d at 1116. On May 6, 1993-approximately three weeks
after its lawful term had expired-the grand jury met and returned an indictment against Dalling.

Id. Dalling moved for the indictment to be dismissed on the basis that the grand jury had no
authority to act and, accordingly, the district court never properly had the case before it. Id. The
district court granted Dalling's motion to dismiss, and on appeal this Court affirmed, finding that
where the grand jury returned an indictment after its term had expired, that indictment was
invalid. Id. at 205, 911 P.2d at 1117 ("Upon the expiration of its term under I.C.R. 6(j), the
grand jury no longer had the authority to meet and return indictments."). Thus in Dafling, this
Court recognized that wher.e a grand jury does not have a legally recognized existence, any
indictments that a grand jury returns are invalid.
The expired grand jury that entered an invalid indictment against Dalling was the same
expired grand jury that entered an invalid indictment against Lute. In fact, the indictments
against Dalling and Lute were entered on the same day. The State conceded below that the grand
jury in this case did not have authority to indict Lute. On appeal, the State devotes much of its
argument to the issue of a "defective indictment" and the effect of a guilty plea on "defects" in
grand jury proceedings. However, there was no "defective" indictment i:ri this case; rather there
was no indictment under the law. Likewise, the group of citizens that issued the purported
indictment was not a grand jury. As such, there was no defect in the grand jury process; rather
there was no grand jury process at all.
As a valid indictment was never entered against Lute, the district court never had subject
matter jurisdiction over Lute's case under Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. See
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132. Therefore, we reverse the district court's denial of

Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion and remand with instructions to grant Lute's motion and vacate Lute's

5

conviction on the basis that the district court never properly had jurisdiction over the case.
Having reversed on this issue, we decline to consider any other arguments raised by Lute.
IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court's denial of Lute's !.C.R. 35 motion, and remand with
instructions to vacate Lute's conviction on the basis that no valid indictment or information was
returned in the case and, as such, the district court never properly had jurisdiction to hear it.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF IDAHO

WILLIAM WOLF,
Petitioner/Defendant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent/Plaintiff.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2005-36455,
and CR 1982-1-8-9-2--9- t '3J.Qo
ORDER DISMISSING MOTION

Mr. Wolf was convicted of murder. In addition to appealing his
conviction he also filed a Motion for relief from an illegal sentence pursuant
to ICR 35 in his criminal case # CR 1982-18920, and a Petition for PostConviction Relief in case # CV 2005-36455. Both the Motion pursuant to
ICR 35 and the Petition for Post-Conviction relief alleged, among other
grounds, that the victim of the crime was an enrolled member of a native
American tribe and that the crime took place within the boundaries of the

Nez Perce Reservation.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEARING

UU0298

1

Mr. Wolf argues that the State of Idaho lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to try him for this crime and his conviction and sentence were
therefore illegal.
The Court, in an order filed May 31, 2005 directed that the issues be
decided in one case, Case #CV 2005-36455. The Court fully addressed all
issues raised by Mr. Wolf in both his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 35 and
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in its Memorandum Opinion of October
26, 2006. All of Mr. Wolf's claims for relief were dismissed by the Court's
Order of December 21, 2006, including his claim that the State of Idaho
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Wolf's request for a hearing on his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR
35 that he filed in December 2004 is DENIED on the grounds and for the
reasons that he has already had a hearing on that Motion and it was Denied.
Dated this 29 th day of April, 2011.

Michael J. Griffi
District Court Judge

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEARING

OUU29~

2

IDAHO COUNTY OISTRICY

AT

------;.. V

William Wolfe
I.D.O.C. #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. BOX 14
1
Idaho 82707

COURT
1-LVCK-.B.. .M.

IO~ jQ f.½-.Ep

JUN - 9 2011
L KA.THY M. ~Kf=RMAN
F /:::, I R!CT COURT
'
DEPUTY

Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAH0 1 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
William Wolfe
Appellant

Case No. CR-1982-18290
S.C. Docket No.

VS.

NaI'ICE OF APPEAL
(I.C.R. 35 ILLEGAL SENTENCE)

STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT I STATE OF IDAHO, JI.ND THE PARTY 1 S ATTORNEYS
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named appellant appeals aginst the above-named respondent to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judicial District Court in the County of
Idaho in the above-entitled action. The Honorable Michael J. Griffin
presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court I and the
Judgment or order described in paragraph l above are appealable orders under
and pursuant to Rule l](c)(l-l0)1I.A.R.
3. a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal I which . the appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal1 provided any such issues on appeal shall not
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal1 are:
ISSUES
On February 221 19821 William Wolfe was charged with first degree murder
in the District Court of Idaho County for Killing Scott Gold outside the
Silver Dollar Bar in Stites Idaho.
Mr. Wolfe contends that Mr. Gold was a Native American and that the
Silver Dollar bar in Stites Idaho is located on the Nez Perce Reservation.
Thus the State Of Idaho did NOT have Subject Matter Jurisdiction and deprived
him of his right to liberty without due process of law.
Dated this

S-

day of June1 2011.

. uo·---·
~
U
~JO u

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :£ day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and
correct copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL for the purpose of filing with the court
and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system for processing
to the U.S. mail system to:

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal 0ivision
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID. 83720-0010

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West MainAve.
Grangeville, ID. 83530

000301.

, IDAHO COUNT( DISTRICT COURT

: lD 1' ')2.
FILED
; AT
- O'CLOCK

A
;

JUN q 2011

William Wolfe
I.D.O.C. #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. BOX 14
Boise, Idaho 83707
1-\ppellant

DOCKETfD

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
William Wolfe
Appellant

)

)

Case No. CR-1982-18290
S.C. Docket No.

------------

)

vs.

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent

___________
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
FEE WAIVER (PRISONER)

)

)

)
)ss
)

Appellant asks to start or defend this case without fees, and swears under
oath:
l. This is an action for I.C.R. 35 Motion.

2. I am unable to pay court costs. I verify that the statements made in this
affidavit are true and correct. I understand that a false statement in this
affidavit is perjury and I can be sent to prison for (1) one to (14) fourteen
years.
3. I have attached to this affidavit a current statement of my inmate account,
certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the activity of the
account over a period of the last 6 months. I understand that I am not an
indigent prisoner, but I am a needy prisoner and am unable to pay fee 1 s or to
hire counsel to represent me.
INDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE
Name William Wolfe, I.D.O.C. #18593
Address: I.S.C.I. Unit l3C-68A P.O. Box 14, Boise ID. 83707.
Date of Birth:
ASSETS
I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, or any real or any other form of
property. I am unable to offer any other form of security.

MOTION Al.\JD AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER)

UUOJO~~
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_ _ _ _ _ ,ll'I.

Dated this

Y

day of June, 2011.

William Wolfe

Witnessed

By, G11.g :,{ /1J:J WV\

Witnessed

By,/«~'@~ Dated

Witnessed B y : < : ; : - - ~
----

Dated

Dated

/2- 5 -//
&- :z:-c/

j,-S-- Ir

(

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER)
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6
day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) for the
purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to:

~/~//4/~

William Wolfe
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Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID. 83720-0010

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West MainAve.
Grangeville, ID. 83530
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= IDOC TRUST-==-======= OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 18593
Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE
Transaction Dates:

05/18/2011 =

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-68

04/0l/2010-05/18/2011

Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
87.04
4424.41
4340.38
3.01
-------------------------------=TRANSACTIONS-------------------------------Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
04/07/2010
04/12/2010
04/13/2010
04/19/2010
04/20/2010
04/26/2010
04/30/2010
04/30/2010
05/04/2010
05/10/2010
05/10/2010
05/19/2010
05/20/2010
05/24/2010
05/24/2010
05 24/2010
05 24/2010
06 01/2010
06/01/2010
06/02/2010
06/02 2010
06/02 2010
06/07 2010
06/07/2010
06/15/2010
06/21/2010
06/21/2010
16/28/2010
J7/02/2010
07/06/2010
07/12/2010
07/19/2010
07/26/2010
08/02/2010
08/04/2010
08/16/2010
J8/16/2010
68/16/2010
68/23/2010

HQ0495144-161
II0495599-046
II0495824-0ll
II0496440-040
II0496550-005
II0497069-040
HQ0497551-050
HQ0497552-050
HQ0498053 009
II0499330 063
II0499330-064
HQ0500351-004
HQ0500585-001
HQ0500719-009
II0500720-009
II0500738-037
II0500738-038
II0501493-003
II0501521-046
HQ0501665-003
II0501666-003
HQ0501818-009
II0502279-048
II0502279-049
II0503495-009
HQ0504083-008
II0504084-008
II0504837-031
HQ0505501-009
II0505667-039
II0506561-045
II0507542-041
II0508248-042
II0508954-029
HQ0509398-010
HQ0511006-002
HQ0511007-008
II0511008-008
II0511745-041

030- 4/2010 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
335- 3/2010 INTERE
935- 3/2010 INTERE
030- 5/2010 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
039-CR CHK<SP.V
066-CK HOBBY
067-CK TX HQ500719
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
066-CK HOBBY
067-CK TX HQ501665
030- 6/2010 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
066-CK HOBBY
067-CK TX HQ504083
099-COMM SPL
030- 7/2010 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030- 8/2010 CI INC
061-CK I;NMATE
066-CK HOBBY
067-CK TX HQ511007
099-COMM SPL

UUUJU:

CI INCOME

INTEREST
INTEREST
CI INCOME
RCPT MO
SA"-l TRANS
111217
111217
160462
163945
163945
CI INCOME

171561
171561
CI INCOME

CI INCOME
176939
136969
136969

253.61
75. 36DB
73.32DB
78.07DB
58.30DB
34.llDB
0.07
0.07DB
256.03
74.40DB
35.00DB
20.00
621.59
105.91DB
5.30DB
79.24DB
332.35DB
5.70DB
59.16DB
51.96DB
2.60DB
234.27
57.82DB
84.lODB
46.12DB
106.96DB
5.35DB
28'.73DB
255.03
75.05DB
66.37DB
14.58DB
59.78DB
33.55DB
272.35
50.00DB
22.07DB
l.lODB
76.39DB

340.65
265.29
191.97
113.90
55.60
21.49
21.56
21.49
277.52
203.12
168.12
188.12
809.71
703.80
698.50
619.26
286.91
281.21
222.05
170.09
167.49
401.76
343.94
259.84
213.72
106.76
101. 41
72.68
327.71
252.66
186.29
171.71
111.93
78.38
350.73
300.73
278.66
277.56
201.17

=
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Doc No. 18593
Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/18/2011 =

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-68

Transaction Dates: 04/0l/2010-05/18/2011
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
87.04
4424.41
4340.38
3.01
--------------------------------TRANSACTIONS----------------------=--=-=-===
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
~8/23/2010
08/30/2010
09/07/2010
09/07/2010
09/13/2010
09/13/2010
09/20/2010
09/27/2010
09/27/2010
10/04/2010
lO 07/2010
10 11/2010
~O 18/2010
10/18/2010
10/25/2010
11/01/2010
11/04/2010
11 08/2010
'11 15/2010
11 17/2010
11 21/2010
·11 26/2010
~1/26/2010
~1/26/2010
ll/29/2010
ll/29/2010
12/06/2010
12/06/2010
12 13/2010
12 13/2010
12 16/2010
12 19/2010
12 20/2010
12/20/2010
12/20/2010
12/22/2010
12/22/2010
12/22/2010
12/27/2010

HQ05ll839-016
II0512627-025
II0513484-036
HQ0513532-010
II05l4499-046
II0514499-047
II05l5259-036
II0516010-022
II0516010-023
II0516803-027
HQ0517618-008
II0517905-051
II05l877l-037
II05l877l-038
II0519483-029
II0520262-020
HQ0520778~009
II0521235-035
II0522080-032
II0522469-007
II0522883-026
II0523384-007
II0523384-008
II0523384-009
II052346l-02l
HQ0523483-005
II0524354-036
HQ0524371-009
II0525676-042
II0525676-043
HQ0526262-005
II0526605-042
II0526794-013
II0526794-015
II0526795-013
II0527197-001
II0527197-006
II0527208-004
II0527533-013

061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030- 9/2010 CI
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030-10/2010 CI
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030-11/2010 CI
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
030-12/2010 CI
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
071-MED CO-PAY

176940
INC CI INCOME

INC CI INCOME

INC CI INCOME
164516
169001
169000
164515
163861
INC CI INCOME
RTCP MO
169002
179154
181803
181818
181804
181826
407427

·,,)
Uuu JUc.

50.00DB
65.99DB
65.72DB
280.96
46.94DB
96.62DB
77.96DB
34.59DB
10.20DB
33.llDB
235.99
53.09DB
17.41DB
34.53DB
36.70DB
30.42DB
314.70
57.44DB
48.35DB
8.30DB
61.61DB
10.70DB
10.70DB
10.70DB
20.89DB
90.00DB
59.47DB
260.26
67.13DB
69.50DB
45.00
55.84DB
10.70DB
5.70DB
0.44DB
0.44DB
0.44DB
0.44DB
8.00DB

151.17
85.18
19.46
300.42
253.48
156.86
78.90
44.31
34.11
1.00
236.99
183.90
166.49
131.96
95.26
64. 84
379.54
322.10
273.75
265.45
203.84
193.14
182.44
171. 74
150.85
60.85
1. 38
261.64
194.51
125.01
170.01
114.17
103.47
97.77
97.33
96.89
96.45
96.01
88.01
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Doc No: 18593
Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/18/2011 =

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-68

Transaction Dates: 04/0l/2010-05/18/2011
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
87.04
4424.41
4340.38
3.01
--------------------------------TRANSACTIONS------------------------------Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
12/27/2010
12/27/2010
01/04/2011
01/10/2011
01/10/2011
01/11/2011
01/17/2011
01/24/2011
01/31/2011
02/03/2011
02/07/2011
02/08/2011
02/14/2011
02/18/2011
02/21/2011
02/21/2011
02/22/2011
02/22/2011
02 23/2011
02 28/2011
03 03/2011
03 07/2011
03/07/2011
03/14/2011
03/21/2011
03/28/2011
04/04/2011
04/06/2011
04/11/2011
04/11/2011
04/11/2011
04/18/2011
04/18/2011
04/25/2011
05/02/2011
05/05/2011
05 09/2011
05 09/2011
05 09/2011

HQ0527580-011
HQ0527580-012
HQ0528425-009
II0529254-036
II0529297-006
HQ0529330-016
II0529953-024
II0530731-022
110531522-018
HQ0532205-009
110532501-036
II0532659-014
II0533321-029
HQ0533875-002
II0533932-028
II0533932-029
HQ0534082-002
II0534083-002
HQ0534214-007
110534718-029
HQ0535242-010
II0535585-036
II0535585-037
1I0536516-028
II0537191-028
II0537917-031
II0538945-037
HQ0539480-010
110539826-003
II0539869-038
II0539869-039
HQ0540778-009
II0540794-030
II0541477-028
110542157-029
HQ0542973-010
II0543265-003
II0543339-041
II0543339-042

061-CK INMATE
061-CK INMATE
030- 1/2011 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030- 2/2011 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
066-CK HOBBY
067-CK TX HQ534082
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
030- 3/2011 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030- 4/2011 CI INC
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030- 5/2011 CI INC
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL

181806
181805
CI INCOME
178923
RTCP MO

CI INCOME
184172
RTCP MO
178915
178915
RTCP MO
CI INCOME

CI INCOME
189324
179201

CI INCOME
188270

25 .-00DB
25.00DB
236.20
57.39DB
2.75DB
25.00
63.87DB
30.55DB
58.54DB
230.97
42.96DB
5.95DB
77.50DB
20.00
25.00DB
22.62DB
139.20DB
6.96DB
25.00
35.15DB
243.92
63.28DB
52.82DB
59.47DB
37.06DB
18.82DB
18.21DB
284.03
6.70DB
66.43DB
23.26DB
100.00DB
55.36DB
22.36DB
9.39DB
225.40
5.95DB
10.20DB
76.69DB

63.01
38.01
274.21
216.82
214.07
239.07
175.20
144.65
86.11
317.08
274.12
268.17
190.67
210.67
185.67
163.05
23.85
16.89
41.89
6.74
250.66
187.38
134.56
75.09
38.03
19.21
1.00
285.03
278.33
211.90
188.64
88.64
33.28
10.92
1. 53
226.93
220.98
210.78
134.09

=
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OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

Doc No: 18593
Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/18/2011

=

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-68

Transaction Dates: 04/0l/2010-05/18/2011
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
87.04
4424.41
4340.38
3.01
============================TRANSACTIONS================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance

---------05/16/2011
05/17/2011
05/17/2011
05/18/2011

-------------

II0544142-025
HQ0544309-006
II0544310-006
HQ0544549-001

---------- ---------- ---------------------------099-COMM SPL
17.02DB
117.07

066-CK HOBBY
178920
067-CK TX HQ544309 178920
079-STATEMENT
178921

108.lSDB
5.41DB
O.SODB

8.92
3.51
3.01

IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

William Wolfe
I .D.O.C. ia8593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. BOX 14
Boise, Idaho 83707

DOC.KiTEo·
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FILED
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Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COUR1' OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
Williai11 Wolfe
Appellant

)
)
)

VS.

)

STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent

)

Case No. CR-1982-18290
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

)

-----------

)
)

COMES NOt-J, William Wolfe, Petitioner-Appellant in the above entitled
matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Appellant's Motion for
Appointment of Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
1. Appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of
Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of warden Johanna
Smith, of the I.S.C.I.
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the
Appe1lant to properly pursue. Appellant lacks the knowledge and skill needed
to represent himself.
3. Appellant required assistance completing these pleading's, as he was unable
to do it himself.
DATED THIS

_l__ day

of June, 2011.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
)ss
)

William Wolfe, Deposes and says as follows:

1. I am the affiant in the above-entitled case;
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.

000309
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2. I am currently residing at the I.S.C.I. under the care, custody and control
of warden Johanna Smith.
3. I am

and do not have any funds to hire privot counsel;

4. I am without bank accounts, stock, bonds, real estate or any other form of
real property;
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security;
6. I am untrained in the law;
7. If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be
unfairly handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the
State;
Further your affaint sayeth naught.
hlHEREFOR, Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue
it 1 s Order granting Appellant's Motion for appointment of Counsel to represent
his interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may
appear the
is entitled to.
Dated this

J'

day of June, 2011.

~~?v~

William Wolfe Appellant
Witnessed

:

Witnessed B y ~ ~
(

6-~-//
------'----

Dated

~, / ~

'iZZ.."~

Dated_._4____-_5_-_/_/_ _

,1

Witnessed~~~~-;:,

Dated

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR APPOINTr1ENT OF COUNSEL.

Uu·1u1:r:
v -~ L

_
t-_____
S:-1/

___;:;;;;_
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5
day of June1 2011. I mailed a true
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT
COUNSEL for the purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true
correct copy via prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system

~/~~ Wt1!d(

William Wolfe

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID. 83720-0010

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West MainAve.
Grangeville1 ID. 83530

r,
U

u

o· _.., - ·

J.i l

and
OF
and
to:

1

2

IDAHO COUNTr' DISTRICT COU~T
F FIU:D
[\
AT- l, IL2 OCLOCK_t:LM

!. ,

Jeff P. Payne
Attorney at Law

JUN 1 3 2011

114 S. Idaho Avenue
Grangeville, ID 83530
Phone: (208) 983-0760
ISB # 3966

4
5

Attorney for: Plaintiff

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

7

8

STATE OF IDAHO,

9

Plaintiff,

10

vs.

11

)
) Case No. CR 18290
)
)
) ORDER APPOINTING
) SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
)

WILLIAM WOLFE,

)
)

12
Defendant.

)

13
14

Having granted Jeff P. Payne's motion for change of special prosecutor in the above-entitled

15

and numbered mater;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

16

:Jo"'>~vk ;'.). . GJ !'";_ k~

, is hereby

17

appointed as Special Prosecutor in the above-entitled matter, in thtt he_yhe- is a suitable person to

18

perform the duties of special prosecutor in this matter.

19

DATED this

day of Cf't....e-

20 it

20
21

District Judge

22
23
24
25

26
27

28

ORDER APPOINTING
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

UU031.2
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JUN 13 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plainti

Case NO. CR 82-18290

vs.
ORDER APPOINTING
STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER
William Wolf<.?
Defendant.

WHEREAS, Defendant appeared before this Court on the charge of
Murder;
WHEREAS, Defendant was found guilty to and was duly convicted
of that offense, and thereafter sentenced to a term of imprisonment
by this Court on August 5, 1982;
WHEREAS,

Defendant

has

requested

the

aid

of

counsel

in

pursuing a direct appeal from this felony conviction, and has filed
a Notice of Appeal
WHEREAS,

(attached hereto);

Defendant has

filed a

Notice of Appeal

(attached

hereto) ;
WHEREAS,
person

this Court is satisfied that Defendant is a needy

entitled to

Defender

(SAPD)

the

services

of

the

pursuant to Idaho Code

§

State Appellate
19-852,

Public

19-854 and 19-

863A;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with Idaho Code§ 19-870,

UU0313

that the SAPD is appointed to represent Defendant in all matters as
cated herein, or until relieved by an order of this Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Idaho County Public Defender as
t

al counsel shall remain as appointed counsel for the purpose of

filing any motions in the District Court which, if granted, could
affect

the

judgment or sentence

in this action,

motions under Idaho Criminal Rules 35 and 36.

such as

those

Trial counsel shall

remain as appointed counsel until such motions have been decided
and the time for appeal thereof has run.
from any of these motions, trial couns

If an appeal is taken

is further responsible for

filing a notice of appeal and moving to have the SAPD appointed to
pursue that appeal.
Dated the

;:;;1-1

day of June 2011.

Michael J./Griftin
District Judge/

UU03l~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I
led a copy of the foregoing order to the following persons on

lo-! o·! I
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703-6914
Attorney General's Office
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Idaho Supreme Court
Attn:
Clerk
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
William Wolfe #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk

OUU3lv

IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
AT

"I';:~
A
I. I,, lo 6c~oc-<_.
__ M_
'v

JUN 1 3 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
)
)
State of Idaho
) Case No. CR 82-18290
Plaintiff(s),
) CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
)
vs.
. )
)
William Wolfe
)
Defendant( s).
I 1 the undersigned, a Deputy Court Clerk of the above-entitled court, do

hereby certify that a copy of the Order Appointing Special Prosecutor filed in this case on
June 13, 2011 was mailed or delivered by me on June 13, 2011 to:
J.A. Wright, delivered to tray

Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk

DE;PUty

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

00031€

I

William Wolfe
I.D.O.C. #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. BOX 14
Boise1 Idaho 83707

JUN ; 7 2011

Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
li'Jilliam Wolfe
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

___________

Case No. CR-1982-18290
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COlJNSEL

)

)

COMES NOW, William Wolfe, Defendant in the above entitled matter and
moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant's Motion for Appointment of
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in
Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
l. Defendant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of
Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of warden Johanna
Smith, of the I.s.c.I.

2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the
Defendant to properly pursue. Defendant lacks the knowledge and skill needed
to represent himself.
3. Defendant required assistance completing these pleading's, as he was unable
to do it himself.

DATED THIS ~,,-/-'-3/_ day of June, 2011.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
)ss
)

William Wolfe, Deposes and says a.s follows:

1.

I~~

the affiant in the above-entitled case;

MOTION Al>-1D AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.

00031'·,
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CE~TIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _d_ day of June, 2011. I mailed a true
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT
COUNSEL for the purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true
correct copy via prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system

William Wolfe

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main
Grangeville ID. 93530

.-, •,
Uuo ,J.lc:
C

and
OF
and
to:

2. I am currently residing at the I.S.C.I. under the care, custody and control
of warden Johanna Smith.
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire privot counsel;
4-. I am without bank accounts, stock, bonds, real estate or any other form of

r-eal property;

5. I am unable to provide any other form of security;
6. I am untrained in the law;

7. If I a.'tl forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be
unfairly handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the
State;

Further your affaint sayeth naught.
WHEREFOR, Defendant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue
it 1 s Order granting Defendant's Motion for appointment of Counsel to represent
his interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may
appear the Defendant is entitled to.
Dated this

/7 day of June,

2011.

William Wolfe Defendant
SUBSCRIBED
June, 2011.

AND

SWORN AND AFFIRMED

to before me

I

/

/

II

/7
r11·
i
/ /If //

r-

<:/'<,../1/(LI/A,1,1 , , ~

.

Not,ar;f,i:P-ci{olic for Idaho /,
I , _,
Cofum{ssion expires: c.----/ 23 / WI 2..
I

!

/

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.
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this

/t/

day of

Williaw Wolfe
I.D.O.C. H8593
P.O. Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707
Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
Wolfe

Case No. CR-1982-18290

Defendant

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT
OF CO(.J1;JSEL

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

IT IS
Counsel
attorney

is
in

HEREBY

ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of

granted

a

and

the State of

Idaho,

is hereby appointed

to

duly

licensed

represent

Defendant in all proceedings involving the Idaho Cdwinal Rule 35 Motion.

Dated this

---

day of June, 2011.

District Judge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

OUU-.;IJ ,_.1r~L

said

£! 'LfCOUN7Y
"O o c_c;c-< -il.M.
/J,.

DISTRICT COURT
FILE::'

IUAHO
r

rvilliam Wolfe
I.D.O.C. U8593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707

A

JUN 1 7 2011

Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
William Wolfe
Defendant

v.
STATE OF IDAHO
PLAINTIFF

___________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-1982-18290
MOTION FOR HEARING

COMES NOW, William Wolfe, Defendant, in the above entitled matter and
moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant's Motion for Hearing so that
information and oral argument can be presented in support of the Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
vJHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issues
it's Order granting Defendant's Motion for Hearing.
Dated this

ff._

day of June, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / ;/ day of June, 2011. I delivered to
prison authorities for the purpose of mailing a true and correct copy of the
Motion For Hearing via prison mail system for process to the U.S. mail system
to:

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main

Grangeville ID. 93530

MOTION FOR HEARING

oou·· v,,.,.,
·-1>1·

William Wolfe
I. D.O. C. #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit l3C-68A
P.O. Box 14
Boise1 Idaho 83707
Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COl:JRT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ·op

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
r·Jilliam Wolfe
Defendant

)
)
)
)

V.

Case No. CR-1982-18290
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR HEARING
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

)

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

___________

)
)
)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Hearing is granted
so that information and oral argument can be presented in support of the Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence. A hearing will be held at
- - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - on the ___ day of ________ 1 2011. at
_____ (time) _ _ _ _ _ _ (tioe zone). The hearing will be held ___ in
person or _ _ _ by telephone. If by telephone the Court will initiate the
phone call at a phone number provided by the IDOC paralegal.

Dated this

---

day.of

-------- ,

District Judge

ORDER GRANTING MO'I'ION FOR HEARING AND NOTICE OF HEARING.

O
"l

t'
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William Wolfe
I.D.O.C. #18593
I. S. C. I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. BOX 14
Boise, Idaho 83707
Defendant

JUN 1 7 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
William Wolfe
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

___________
STATE OF IDAHO
COIJNTY OF ADA

Case No. CR-1982-18290
MOTION Ai."'1D AFFIDAVIT FOR
FEE WAIVER (PRISONER)

)

)

)
)ss
)

Defendant asks to start or defend this case without fees, and swears under
oath:
1. This is an action for I.C.R. 35 Motion.

2. I am unable to pay court costs. I verify that the statements made in this
affidavit are true and correct. I understand that a false statement in this
affidavit is perjury and I can be sent to prison for (1) one to (14) fourteen
years.
3. I have attached to this affidavit a current statement of my inmate account,
certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the activity of the
account over a period of the last 6 months. I understand that I am not an
indigent prisoner, but I am a needy prisoner and am unable to pay fee's or to
hire counsel to represent me.
INDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE
Name William Wolfe, I.D.O.C. U8593
Address: I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A P.O. Box 14, Boise ID. 83707.
Date of Birth
ASSETS
I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, or any real or any other form of
property. I am unable to offer any other form of security.
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER)

pg-1

Dated this / , / day of June, 2011.

William rvolfe

/

r

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this /
2011.

Notrary>'. uolic ~for Idaho/
/
C6r,1mission expires: .:Z:1 2:.? . 2v i 3
I

I

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER)

,,U'u· uJ~·.t
- -~ , ,

pg-2

c:_/
I

day of June I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1/

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /
day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and
correct copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR FEE WAIVER (PRISONER) for the
purpose of filing with the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to:

William Wolfe

7

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main
Grangeville ID. 93530
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IDOC TRUST--========= OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

-=========

Doc No: 18593
Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

06/07/2011 =

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-68

Transaction Dates: 12/01/2010-06/07/2011
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
60.85
1695.06
1929.75
295.54
-=---------=-===================TRANSACTIONS-------------------------------Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
12/06/2010
12 06/2010
12 13/2010
12 13/2010
12 16/2010
12/19/2010
12/20/2010
12/20/2010
12/20/2010
12/22/2010
12/22/2010
12/22/2010
12/27/2010
12/27/2010
12/~7/2010
01/04/2011
01/i°0/2011
01/10/2011
01/11/2011
01/17/2011
01/24/2011
11/31/2011
02/03/2011
02/07/2011
02/08/2011
02/14/2011
02/18/2011
02/21/2011
02/21/2011
02/22/2011
02 22/2011
02 23/2011
02 28/2011
03/03/2011
03/07/2011
U3/07/2011
03/14/2011
63/21/2011
03/28/2011

II0524354-036
HQ0524371-009
II0525676-042
II0525676-043
HQ0526262-005
II0526605-042
II0526794-013
II0526794-015
II0526795-013
II0527197-001
II0527197-006
II0527208-004
II0527533-013
HQ0527580-011
HQ0527580-012
HQ0528425-009
II0529254-036
II0529297-006
HQ0529330-016
II0529953 024
II0530731-022
II0531522-018
HQ0532205-009
II0532501-036
II0532659-014
II0533321-029
HQ0533875-002
II0533932-028
II0533932-029
HQ0534082-002
II0534083-002
HQ0534214-007
II0534718-029
HQ0535242-010
II0535585-036
II0535585-037
II0536516-028
II053719l-028
II0537917-031

099-COMM SPL
030-12/2010 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
071-MED CO-PAY
061-CK INMATE
061-CK INMATE
030- 1/2011 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030- 2/2011 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099 COMM SPL
066-CK HOBBY
067-CK TX HQ534082
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
030- 3/2011 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL

CI INCOME
RTCP MO
169002
179154
181803
181818
181804
181826
407427
181806
181805
CI INCOME
178923
RTCP MO

CI INCOME
184172
RTCP MO
178915
178915
RTCP MO
CI INCOME

UUUJ>(.
•
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59.47DB
260.26
67.13DB
69.50DB
45.00
55.84DB
10.70DB
5.70DB
0.44DB
0.44DB
0.44DB
0.44DB
8.00DB
25.00DB
25.00DB
236.20
57. 39DB
2.75DB
25.00
63.87DB
30.55DB
58.54DB
230.97
42.96DB
5.95DB
77.50DB
20.00
25.00DB
22.62DB
139.20DB
6.96DB
25.00
35.15DB
243.92
63.28DB
52.82DB
59.47DB
37.06DB
18.82DB

1. 38
261.64
194.51
125.01
170.01
114.17
103.47
97.77
97.33
96.89
96.45
96.01
88.01
63.01
38.01
274.21
216.82
214.07
239.07
175.20
144.65
86.11
317.08
274.12
268.17
190.67
210.67
185.67
163.05
23.85
16.89
41.89
6.74
250.66
187.38
134.56
75.09
38.03
19.21

= IDOC TRUST=-========= OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

-=========

Doc No: 18593
Name: WOLFE, WILLIAM FRANKLIN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

06/07/2011 =

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-68

Transaction Dates: 12/01/2010-06/07/2011
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
60.85
1695.06
1929.75
295.54
'==============-=================TRANSACTIONS================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance

----------

04/04/2011
04/06/2011
04/11/2011
04/11/2011
04/11/2011
04/18/2011
04/18/2011
04/25/2011
05/02/2011
05/05/2011
05/09/2011
05/09/2011
05/09/2011
05/16/2011
,o 5 / 1 7 / 2 011
.05/1 7/2011

:05 / 18 / 2 011
05/25/2011
.05 / 31/ 2011
,o 6 I o6 I 2 o11
06/06/2011
06/07/2011

------ -----II0538945-037
HQ0539480-010
II0539826-003
II0539869-038
II0539869-039
HQ0540778-009
II0540794-030
II0541477 028
II0542157-029
HQ0542973-010
II0543265-003
II0543339-041
II0543339-042
II0544142-025
HQ0544309-006
·tro~44310 -o o6
HQ0544549-001
HQ0545110-005
II0545545-047
HQ0546326-008
II0546413-055
II0546533-003

---------------------------- ---------- ---------18.21DB
1.00

099-COMM SPL
030- 4/2011 CI INC
072-METER MAIL.
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
030- 5/2011 CI INC
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
066-CK HOBBY
067-CK TX HQ544309
079-STATEMENT
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
030- 6/2011 CI INC
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL

CI INCOME
189324

284.03
6.70DB
66.43DB
23.26DB
100.00DB
55.36DB
22.36DB
9.39DB
225.40
5.95DB
10.20DB
76.69DB
17.02DB
108.lSDB
5.41DB
0.50DB
40.00
29.17DB
293.97
11.87DB
0.40DB

179201

CI INCOME
188270

178920
178920
178921
RTCP MO
CI INCOME
181827

'

.• ,....., ,,._. + ,.( ,·;;-·: '•• ,· -;c·.,•.... ~ •.:_'

ST.ATE OP IDAOO
~ ~ 5 1 zyf ~ 1 i
1 ~~'.b,;J certify 1!oo1t ~ foregoing is a fulf, ttir-~ ffl'i&

co11!'.eci OOJPY of an instrumell]t as the same now r e ~
o;rn fire allld! of reoordl in my office.
WITNESS my hand hereto affixed this
7 111
___.

®1<>1'..-

~,~

AD..20..LL

By_·=·-=-·----..~ ~ ~ . Q Y , . ~ L __ _ __

,, u· uJ~t
,. , ,. .
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285.03
278.33
211.90
188.64
88.64
33.28
10.92
1. 53
226.93
220.98
210.78
134.09
117.07
8.92
3.51
3.01
43.01
13.84
307.81
295.94
295.54
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William Wolfe
I.D.O.C. #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit l3C-68A
P.O. Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707

JUN 1 7 2011

Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
t·villiam Wolfe
Defendant

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO

-----------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-1982-18290
MOTION FOR CORRECTION
OF SENTENCE, ICR 35

COMES NOW, William Wolfe, Defendant in the instant action, and pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, moves this honorable Court for its Order:
Correcting the Defendant's illegal sentence.
1. The Defendant was convicted of first degree murder before the Honorable
Judge George Reinhardt and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the custody
of the Idaho Department of Corrections for:
A fixed term of life.
2. The Defendant has been incarcerated since February 20th,
served 29 years & 4 months of the sentence:

1982. and has

3. The Defendant believes:
The sentence is illegal and should be changed on the following grounds:
Mr. Wolfe claims that the State did not have
Jurisdiction" in this matter because of the following:

"Subject

Matter

l. The incident happened in Stites Idaho, which is located on the Nez Perce

indian reservation ( See Exhibit "A", map produced by the Nez Perce tribe
wildlife program, using ARC/Info.). Also in State V. Rittel, MR. Rittel was
charged with a felony that occurred in Stites Idaho. (See Exhibit "B",
criminal complaint State V. Ri ttel.)
In State V. Ri ttel the Idaho County prosecuting attorney, Kirk A.
MacGreagor ISB#3880 filed a Motion To Dismiss Without Prejudice, stating the
reason for this as; Mr. Rittel is an enrolled member of a recognized native
American tribe and the crime occurred within the boundary of the Nez Perce
Indian reservation and accordingly the District Court of Idaho County lacked
"Subject Matter Jurisdiction" of the Defendant. (See Exhibit "E", State V.
Rittel, Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice).
MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35

UU0328
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In U.S.A. V. RHtel: the U.S. DISTRICT Court stipulates as to Mr. Rittel's
indian blood and the place of the offense. ( See Exhibit "D", U.S.A. V.
Rittel, pg-6, item #65 ).
2. Scott Gold was
tribal enrollment
military records,
Mr. Gold's indian

an enrolled member of a recognized tribe. ( See Exhibit "C",
of Scott Gold ) . Also the court has Mr. Golds medical and
which are sealed to the court, thus showing further proof of
status. Pleas take Judicial note of these records to.

3. Under the treaty of 1963 with the Nez Perce tribe, (Also known as the Major
Crime Act) This treaty governs the jurisdiction issues between the tribe,
State, and Federal government's.
In the Act it shows that the offences listed in§ 1153 Title 18, United
States Code, commonly known as the ten Major Crimes, which includes murder,
shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. ( See Exhibit
"F", Resolution, pg-2, paragraph l ) . Also in U.S.A. V. Bruce the United
States 9th circuit Court of Appeals further defines " Who is an indian" ( See
Exhibit "G", U.S.A V. Bruce, pg. 1-2, Items #4 & #6 ) in U.S.A. V. Bruce the
9th circuit Court of Appeals also discusses who fall under Federal
jurisdiction on an indian reservation. ( See Exhibit "G", pg. 4-6, Discussion
) In U.S.A. V. Bruce the Court says, "Crimes in which the victim, but not the
perpetrator, is indian are subject to (a) Federal jurisdiction under § 1152,
as well as pursuant to Federal criminal law of general applicability. ( See
Exhibit "G", pg. 6, item ,n ) .
4. In a recent opinion of the Idaho State Supreme Court, state V. Lute. (See
Exhibit "H", State V. Lute ) Mr Lute filed a rule 35 Motion for Correction of
an illegal sentence. In it he is claiming the State did not have Subject
Matter Jurisdiction. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Lute and vacated
his conviction. Showing that Mr. Wolfer s claim that the State did not have
Subject Matter Jurisdiction can be brought through this Rule 35 Motion for
Correction of an illegal sentence.
HHEREFORE, the Defendant, William Wolfe, respectfully prays the Honorable
Court to correct the sentence as follows:
Vacate Mr. Wolfe's conviction or grant such other and further relief, as the
Court deems appropriate.
respectfully submitted this

_/!j__ day

of June, 2011.

u/.t//2$/'r p t / ~

William Wolfe Defendant
I HEREBY CERTIFY that
prison authorities for the
MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF
processing to the U.S. mail

CERTIFICATE, MAILING
on the
/
day of June, 2011. I delivered to
purpose of 'mailing a true and correct copy of the
SENTENCE, ICR 35 via prison mail system for
system to:
Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West Main
Grangeville ID. 93530

U,_/ ~ .
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Williamtfolfe Defendant
MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 pg-2
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Program

1

IDAHO COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

2

POBOX463
4 1 6 WEST MAIN
GRANGEVILLE, ID 83530
PHONE: (208) 983-01 66

3

FAX: (208) 983-391 9

4

KIRK A. MACGREGOR • PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DENNIS L. ALBERS • DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

5
6

7

8

9 · IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
10
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

11
Plaintiff,
12

vs.

13
14

15

WILLIAM DANIEL RITTEL,

11 l)

<

Case No. l#\ 0.-.)~

~
'\'I(.-,,..
.,j/)if--.'°:) (.;

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

'}

Defendant.

A

16

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this

17

/<1<t._

,,,,,,-

~ -

day of .Aftgllst, 2005, Idaho County

Prosecuting Attorney, KIRK A. MacGREGOR, who being duly sworn, on oath, complains and says:

18
On or about December 18, 2005, in the County of Idaho, State of Idaho, the crime of

19
20

22

That the Defendant, on or about the 18 th day of December, 2005, in Stites, County of
Idaho, State ofldaho, did unla\\rfully and maliciously bite off a portion of the ear of
JARROD CARTER, a human being, permanently disfiguring the sai_d JARROD
CARTER, a felony in violationofidaho Code Section 18-5001.

23

contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute. in such case made and provided, and against the

24

peace and dignity of the State ofldaho, and this Complainant, upon oath, accuses the said defendant

25

of having committed such crimes and prays that he · e dealt with according to law.

21

26
KIRK A. MacGREGOR, ISB#3880
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney
Complain~nt

27
28
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - 1

.
U

u· ... -, .--_. (·

LJjj~

1

2

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ~ day of December, 2005.

4

JUDGE
5
6
7

8

9

10
11
12

13

14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27

28
CRlMINAL COMPLAINT - 2
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iN REPLY REFER TO:
ENROLL'v'!EN,

P.O.'Boz.,850
'Brou/rt.iiff; Af'T 59417

(406} 338-7524
! hereby certify that the following named individual is listed on the official records of this o'iiice:

GOLD.

SCOTT RI CHARD

201-U-10112

------~···-· ···-···-····-··-·-------·-·· -~--

---------

·····-

DATE OF BIRTH ENROLLiv.1ENT NC.

NAl'v1E

QUANTUM.
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1.
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Assigned to: Honorable Edward J. Lodge

Defendant
William D Rittel (1)
TERMINATED: 10/12/2006

represented by James Edward Siebe
SIEBE LAW OFFICES
PO Box 9045
Moscow, ID 83 843
(208) 883-0622
Fax: 1-208-882-8769
Email: jsiebe@moscow.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: CJA Appointment
Kathleen Moran
FEDERAL DEFENDER'S OFFICE
10 N Post St #700
Spokane, WA 99210
(509) 624-7606
Fax: 1-509-747-3539
Email: kailey_moran@fd.org
TERMINATED: 08/21/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
Designation: CJA Appointment
Disposition

Pending Counts
None

Highest Offense Level (Opening)
None
Disposition

Terminated Counts

of7

00033 ..

8/3/2007 11 :40 AM

ASSAULT RESlJLTING IN S~RlOUS
BODILY INJURY
(1)

Not Guilty

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
Felony

Complaints

Disposition

None

Plaintiff
USA

Date Filed

,f7

represented by Joshua B. Taylor
United States Attorney's Office
205 N. 4th Street
Room306
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
(208) 667-6568
Fax: (208) 667-0814
Email: josh.taylor@ag.idaho.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
#

Docket Text

07/18/2006

<.i} 1

INDICTMENT (Notice sent to USP & USM) as to William D Rittel (1)
count(s) 1. (Attachments:# l Cover Sheet#; Foreperson's signature) Ga,)
(Entered: 07/20/2006)

07/20/2006

<.i}2

*SEALED* Arrest Warrant Issued in case as to William D Rittel. (Notice
sent to USM) Ga,)

08/04/2006

133 MOTION to Quash WARRANT AND ISSUE SUMMONS by USA as to
William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)

08/04/2006

Q4 ORDER granting l Motion to Quash warrant and to issue summons (Notice
sent to USM) as to William D Rittel (1). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge.
(caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on
the Notice of Electronic Fili~g (NEF) by dks,)

08/04/2006

'35 Summo:i:is Issued in case as to William D Rittel Arraignment/Initial
Appearance set for 8/14/2006 03:30 PM in Moscow, ID before Honorable
Larry M. Boyle. (dks,)

08/08/2006

~6 Arrest Warrant Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel. (wm,)
(Entered: 08/09/2006)

UUUJ3l

8/3/2007 11 :40 AM

OR/1 L.1.nnnh

~7 Minute Entry for proceeding~ held before Judge La..'1}' M. Boyle
:Arraignment as to William D Rittel (1) Count 1 held on 8/14/2006 Plea
entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM), Initial Appearance held on
8/14/2006 Plea entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM) Jury Trial
set for 10/10/2006 09:30 AM in Coeur d Alene, ID before Honorable
Edward J. Lodge. (Cow'i Reporter Nancy Persinger.) (le, ) (Entered:
08/15/2006)

08/14/2006

~8 CJA 23 Financial Affidavit by William D Rittel (dks,) (Entered:
08/15/2006)

08/14/2006

~9 PROCEDURAL ORDER as to William D Rittel . Signed by Judge Larry M.

,._,....,,

"'-

11

~VVV

Boyle. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks,) (Entered:
08/15/2006)
08/14/2006

)f7

~10 ORDER Setting Conditions of Release as to William D Rittel (1) PR (Notice
sent to USP & USM). Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. (caused to be
mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of
Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks, ) (Entered: 08/15/2006)

08/14/2006

(Court only) Terminate Deadlines and Hearings as to William D Rittel: arr
held 8/14/06 Ga) (Entered: 08/16/2006)

08/14/2006

(Court only) ***Procedural Interval start P2 8/14/06 as to William D Rittel
Ga, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006)

08/16/2006

~11
- RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

08/16/2006

()12 MOTION for Discovery GOVERNMENT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST by
USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)

08/16/2006

()13 Summons Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel (Notice sent
to USP) Ga)

08/17/2006

()14 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

08/21/2006

()15 MOTION CJA Appointment by William D Rittel. (Moran, Kathleen)

08/21/2006

~16
- ORDER granting J1 Motion for CJA Counsel as to William D Rittel (1).
CJA Attorney James Siebe substituted for Kathleen Moran. Signed by Judge
Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the
addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by ja,) (emailed to
J. Siebe by ja).

08/24/2006

<;) 17 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S

-

SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

08/30/2006

(;JJ 8

08/31/2006

~19
- RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Siebe, James)

000337

8/3/2007 11 :40 AM

-

09/06/2006

Q20 M
-

09/11/2006

¼121 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)
-

09/11/2006

Q22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial Setting by William D Rittel. (Siebe,
James)

09/11/2006

¼123 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)
-

09/11/2006

Q24 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)
-

09/11/2006

Q25 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)
-

09/13/2006

Q26 MEMORANDUM in Opposition by William D Rittel re 24 MOTION in
Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine (Siebe, James)

09/14/2006

Q27 NOTICE of Withdrawal ofMotion for Vacation and Continuance of Trial
Setting by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial
Setting (Siebe, James)

09/15/2006

Q28 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l # l # J # i)(Siebe, James)
-

09/15/2006

Q CORRECTIVE ENTRY -The entry docket number 27 Notice (Other) filed
by William D Rittel, was filed using the incorrect docket event. The filing
party shall re-submit their filing using "Withdrawal of Motion" located
under Other Documents. Ga,)

09/15/2006

Q29 WITHDRAWAL of Motion by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate
and Continue Trial Setting filed by William D Rittel, (Siebe, James)

09/18/2006

Q30 EXP ARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 28 Sealed Document (Notice
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga,)

09/18/2006

(Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: subpoenas issued &
given to USMS as per Court's Order dkt #30 Ga,)

09/18/2006

(Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: mailed ex parte order
dkt #30 to James Siebe Ga,)

09/19/2006

Q31 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

09/20/2006

Q32 REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion by USA as to William D Rittel re 24
MOTION in Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine
(Taylor, Joshua)

09/21/2006

~33 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l)(Siebe, James)

09/22/2006

~34 EX PARTE ORDER (SEALED) as to William D Rittel re 33 Sealed
- Document (Notice sent to· USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge.

09/22/2006
09/25/2006

of7

ION in Limine by Wiiliam D Rittel. (Siebe, Ja.'11es)

(Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: issued subpoena and
gave to USMS for service (SEALED) Ga,)
Q35 TRIAL BRIEF by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

000338

8/3/2007 11 :40 AM

.
09/25/2006

<l36 RE.__PONSE to Motion by USA as to vVilliam D Rirtel re 20 MOTION in
Limine (Taylor, Joshua)

09/29/2006

()37 Docket Entry NOTICE OF HEARING as to William D Rittel (Notice sent to
USP & USM) PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the TIME for the Jury Trial set
for Tuesday, October 10, 2006 in Coeur d Alene, Idaho before the Honorable
Edward J. Lodge, HAS BEEN CHANGED from 9:30 am to 1:30pm.
(caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on
the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cv, )

10/02/2006

()3g RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rirtel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

10/03/2006

()39 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l)(Siebe, James)

10/03/2006

Q40 RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Supplemental) (Siebe,
James)

10/03/2006

Q41 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)
-

10/03/2006

Q42 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/03/2006

Q43 Proposed Voir Dire by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/03/2006

Q44 TRIAL BRIEF by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/03/2006

()45 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/03/2006

Q46 EY....HIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

10/04/2006

()47 EXP ARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 39 Sealed Document (Notice
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga) Modified
on 10/4/2006 (ks): copy emailed to J. Siebe.

10/04/2006

()43 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

10/04/2006

)f7

(Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: Certified copy of Order
#4 7 provided to USM; Subpoena provided to USM by J. Angelo (ks)

10/04/2006

()49 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

10/04/2006

Q50 Proposed Voir Dire by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)
-

10/04/2006

@51 Objection by William D Rittel to 43 Proposed Voir Dire filed by USA,
(Siebe, James)

10/04/2006

Q52 Objection by William D Rittel to 42 Proposed Jury Instructions filed by
USA, (Siebe, James)

10/05/2006

()53 MOTION for Individual Voir Dire by William D Rittel. (Siebe, James)

10/05/2006

()54 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

10/05/2006

()55 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

10/06/2006

·@56 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

000339:
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10/09/2006

Qc'"l

10/09/2006

@58 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

10/10/2006

Q59
- Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

10/10/2006

@65 STIPULATION as to dft's Indian blood and place of offense by USA Glg, )
(Entered: 10/16/2006)

'-

r.:::--

""'.; I

-

EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to Wiiliam D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

10/10/2006

Q66 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Pretrial
Hearing as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006, granted 20 MOTION in
Limine filed by William D Rittel, gra.nted 53 MOTION for Individual Voir
Dire filed by William D Rittel. Stipulation 65 put on the record. (Court
Repo1ier Lisa Yant.) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/10/2006

Q67 Sealed Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge
:Voir Dire begun on 10/10/2006 William D Rittel (1) on Count 1, Jury
Selection as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa
Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/10/2006

@68 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial
(Day 1) as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa
Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/11/2006

Q69 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge: Jury
Trial (Day 2) as to William D Rittel held on 10/11/2006 (Court Reporter
Lisa Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

Q70 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial
(Day 3 - Final Day) as to William D Rittel held on 10/12/2006. Defendant
found not guilty. (Court Reporter Lisa Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

'l71 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

@72 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

<;;j73 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

Q74 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

@75 Jury Instructions as to William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

Q76 JURY VERDICT as to William D Rittel (1) Not Guilty on Count 1. (Notice
sent to USP) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

<,77 JUDGMENT of Acquittal as to William D Rittel (1), Count(s) 1, Not Guilty
(Notice sent to USP and USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused
to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the
Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by jlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/13/2006

~60 Subpoena Returned Un-Executed, Service un-exexuted as to Bernie York
Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/13/2006

()61 Subpoena Returned Executed served Janie Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice
sent to USM) Glg, ) {Entered: 10/16/2006)

-

8/3/2007 11 :40 AM

10/1 V?OOf;

Qi:;'")

10/13/2006

Q63 Subpoena Returned Executed served Brian Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice
sent to USM) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/13/2006

Q64 Subpoena Returned Executed served MaryAnn York on 10/4/2006. (Notice
sent to USM) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/23/2006

()73 Subpoena Returned Executed served Missy Clark on I 0/6/2006. (Notice sent
to USM) Glg,) (Entered: 10/25/2006)

03/23/2007

()79 CIA 20 as to William D Rittel: Appointment of Attorney James Edward
Siebe for William D. Rittel. Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. Glg,)
(Entered: 03/26/2007)

-

-v,:;.,;

Subpoena Returned Executed served Coiieen Baker on 10/4/2006. (Notice
sent to USM) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

8/3/2007 11 :40 AM
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IDAHO COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P080X463
4 1 6 WEST MAIN
GRANGEVILLE, 10 83530
PHONE: (208) 983-01 66
FAX: (208) 983-391 9

2
3

4

ROSE ~EHRING

.

\ Q"" C1-fi:£l_KAF ED. :rR!CT COURT
!\,-h~L&r.\ .._\-1.---~ ' · ~ DEPU1Y__

KIRK A. MACGREGOR • PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DENNIS L. ALBERS • DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

5
6

7

8

IN THE DISTRICT COD"RT OF THE SECON'D JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF

9

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

10

STATE OF IDAHO,
11

12

vs.
13

14

WILLIAM DANIEL RITTEL,

15

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CROS-30850
MOTION TO DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

16
COMES NOW, KIRK A. MacGREGOR, Prosecuting Attorney in and for Idaho County, and
17

moves the Court to dismiss without prejudice the above entitled case on the grounds and for the
18

reasons that the above named defendant, WILLIAM DANIEL RITTEL, is an enrolled member of a
19

recognized Native American Tribe and the crime occurred within the boundaries of the NezPerce
20
Indian Reservation and accordingly Idaho County lacks jurisdiction of the defendant.
21

22

DATED this

lZ day of January, 2006.

/

L

23

~J'.:.;.cGREGOR, ISB#3880
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney

24
25

26
27

28
MOTION TO DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE - I

0003~2

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served
upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated below on the 17 day of January, 2006:

3
4
5

U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered _ _ Courthouse Tray
Via Facsimile

James Edward Siebe
Attorney at Law
PO Box 9045
Moscow, ID 83843

6

--=/~--

7

/

KIRK A. MacGREGOR, ISB#3880

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15

16
17

18

19
20

21
22
23

24
25
26

27

28
MOTION TO DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE ~ 2
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WHER EASl the Nez Perce Tribal Execulive Committee has been empowered
act
for and in c,ehalf of lhe Nez Perce Tribe, pursuant to lhe Revised Constitution and
By-Laws, adopted by the General Council of lhe Nez Perce·Tribe, on May 6, 1961
and approved by the Act1ng Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on June 27, 1961; and

_\l/HER.EAS, by Act. of August 15, 1963, Public Law 280, 83rd Congress, First Session,
the United St.ates consented lo the exercise of criminal and civil jur_isdiction by the ..
States over Indians and Indian reservations, and
WHEREAS, by Chapter 58, Laws of 1963, State oi Idaho, the ;state of Idaho assumes
and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and criminal enforcement of State laws a.'ld ·:requ1.aUons concernLr1g comnulsory school attendance; juvenile delinquency and youth
rehabilitation; dependent, neglected and abused children; insa."'1ities and mental illness;

public assistance; domestic relations; and op:::ration.and management of mot.or U::hlcles
upon highways and roads maLr1talned by th_~ cqurity or.. state, or political sub::livLsions
thereof, Lri Ind i.an country within the State·;' as Indian country is deiined by Title 181
Section 1151, United State~ Code 1 and
·, .
WFEREAS, by Section 2 of Chapter 58 the State of Ida.ho obligates and bLr1ds ilseli to
the assumption of such additional jurisdiction as is determined by a resolution of t..11€
tribal qo-v-ernL11g bcdy and becomes effective UIX)n the Tril:-€ rs transmittal of the resolution to t.I-1e Attorney General oi the St.ale of Idaho, and
WHEREAS 1 the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee is the duly constituled govern.,.,-,~
:.ng body 01 the Nez Perce Tribe, and
··
. .
·:,. .
. ... .
.
,

WHEREAS, the Indians residi...r1g on·the Nez Perce Indian Reservation in Lewis, Nez
.Perce, Clearwater, and Idaho- Counties in the State of Idaho, acting through the Nez
Perce Tribal Executive .Committee, their governing body duly recognized by the Bure.a:
of fodian Affairs, are desirous at ll-iis tinie of having the State of Idaho assu.r:ne a.11d
·exercise concurrent crimi.n.al jurisdiction over offenses qther than those commonly
_· known ·as tp.e major_ crimes, committed by Indians residing o_n' the reservation, and
WHEREAS, '"the Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho r-...a.s Treaty rigt.t:: to fish at usual and accustomed pl.aces, along wit....1-i hunting rights_
.
. · ·

NCW, THEREFORE 1 BE IT RESOLVED, by the Nez Perce Tribal E:secuUve Corrmitte€
the governing body of the· Nez Perce Indi?,n Reservation, in the aforesaid counties o-f th,
State of Ida.ho, at a. duly constituted meetina of said Comrr.i lt<2e, that consent is given. tc
,'.Jhe assumption ·by lhe State oi Idaho of conc:_urrent criminal jurisdiction within the Nez
··Perc,e Ind i.2..i:i R~-~:.r"'.ation over the following o:tfe.ns·es: ·.-· ·· ' -~. ·. ·

~
- .,

Drunkncss, Dislurbing the peace, :Conlribuli~g· to th~: dei.inqui:ncy of a.
minor, Procuring intoxicant:; for r..inors, Simple a:;:.;au1t, Batt~ry,. Kid-·
napping, Embezzlement, Fraud, Forgery, 'IZeceivinq ~tolen pro~rtJ, ·. ·
Extortion, Indecency and obscenity, Vagrar.cy, Tre:..:.:.p;.1ssi:lg and IJE.llcious
injuries to properr.y, Public nuisance and al::::alement U:c:::-eof, Cruelty to
anlmals, and carrying concealed and dangerous weapons in pLlblic places
(t.he carr1ing of firearms in- pursuit of treaty hur.tir.g rights expressly· ·.... ·· .:··· . ,·
excluded).
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·-

. L.Y.~P,~~~1t:ll~~~~.i.~~~~ei_~~.rsie· :- .Sectiof:-1.1~3/ Tille,18,
United ~~es Cs,d7, ·1:ommonly ·kno?Jn .. ~~-~he .t -: ajor::<;:t:JDJ?~, L e.~murder, '-'man0 slaughter:, . . rape,;---rnce-sl1 assault wtth mlen to kill, assuall with a dangerous weapon,
~ar~on;--, burglr1.ry;-,i.robbery, anc}.ilarceny; and ...
mbezzlement or theft of fonds or
properly of 2.n Indlan tribal o:rg:inization as provided by Federal law, shall remain
under lhe jurisdiction of the Federa.1 Government until such time as the Nez Perce
Tribal Executive Committee shall enact an appropriate resolution expressing the desire of the people of the Nez Perce Reservation that the Slate of Idaho accept additional
· criminal jurisdiction ~f such crimes, and. ·
·
~B-~;fr.rFURTHER~·

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVE[?, that the ·Nez Perse Tribe retains jurisdiction· over all ·
ofien.ses over which it may presently exercise criminal jurisdiction through enactment.
of an appropriate Law and Order Code, and
···,

oi

BE. IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that this resoiutlon expressing the desire
the people
of the Nez Parc.e Indian Reservatton to accept the criminal jurisdiction of the St.ate of .
Idaho, as herein provided, be forwarded lo the Attorney General of the St.ate of Idaho,
pursuant to Chapter 58, Laws of 1963, enac.ted by th2 Legislature of lhe S~le of Idaho
on }..,farch 6 1 1063, and
· · ·
· :-~ =-·.
.
·...... ~.....

BE IT FURTH SR RESOLVED1· that nothi.hg ~:.this resolution shall be construed as an
?,brcga_tion of Section 3, Chapter 58, Laws of 1963, the State oi Idaho •.
.

.

CERT
..I F I C A T I O N

-------------

.-fJ,The foregoing resolution was duly adopted by the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Commit•· . ti::-e meeting i1;. regular session on . the 13th day
of April, 1965, at Lapwai, Idaho.
.
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Synopsis
Background: Defendant was convicted, in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana, Sam E. Haddon, J., of simple assault on Indian child on reservation.
She appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bybee, Circuit Judge. held that:
'. defendant satisfied burden of production on her affirmative defense that she was
Indian, and
~: trial court's failure to let jury consider defense was not harmless error.
Reversed and remanded.
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Change View
Indians

Appeal

District court's determination of criminal defendant's Indian status is mixed
question of law and fact, reviewed de novo. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152.
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Criminal Law

Mixed Questions of Law and Fact

Criminal Law

Review De Novo

"Mixed questions of law and fact," which are subject to de novo review, are
those in which historical facts are admitted or established, rule of law is
undisputed, and issue is whether facts satisfy statutory standard.

3

Indians

Presumptions and Burden of Proof

Criminal defendant's Indian status is affirmative defense, in prosecution under
statute which contains exception for crime committed by Indian against Indian
victim; defendant must come forward with enough evidence of her Indian
status to permit fact-finder to decide issue in her favor, though government
retains ultimate burden of persuading fact-finder that exception is
inapplicable. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

G

Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status
Indians
Test for person's Indian status considers (1) person's degree of Indian blood;
and (2) tribal or government recognition of person as Indian.
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7 Cases that cite this headnote

5.

Indians

Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status

Evidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is clearly
identified as Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy "Indian blood" prong of test
for Indian status.
4 Cases that cite this headnote
Indians

Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status

Factors court considers, in declining order of importance, when analyzing
··tribal or government recognition" prong of test for Indian status are: (1) tribal
enrollment; (2) receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; (3) enjoyment of
benefits of tribal affiliation; and (4) social recognition as Indian through
residence on reservation and participation in Indian social life.

9 Cases that cite this headnote
7

indians

Who Is an Indian; Tribal Status

Defendant charged with assaulting Indian satisfied burden of production on
her affirmative defense that she was Indian, within meaning of charging
statute's exception for crimes committed by Indians against Indian victims;
defendant was one-eighth Chippewa Indian and, though she was not enrolled
in tribe or recognized as Indian by federal government, she was born on
reservation and currently lived on one, participated in Indian religious
ceremonies, had on several occasions been treated at Indian hospitals, and
had previously been arrested by tribal authorities. i 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152.
18 Cases that cite this headnote

8

Indians {=

Appeal

Trial court's erroneous failure to submit question of defendant's Indian status
to jury, in prosecution for assault on Indian child, was not harmless;
government was relieved of burden of proving what would have been element
of offense if defendant had been prosecuted as Indian rather than as nonIndian, and her conviction as non-Indian had possibly adverse future
consequences outside criminal context. 18 U .S.CA §§ 1152, 1153.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

9

Criminal Law

Prejudice to Defendant in General

Test for harmless error is not whether jury would have reached same verdict
in absence of error, but whether error had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining jury's verdict.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1217 John Rhodes and Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Public Defender's Office,
Missoula, MT, Michael Donahoe, Federal Defenders of Montana, Helena, MT, for the
defendant-appellant.
Marcia Hurd, William W. Mercer and Klaus P. Richter, United States Attorney's Office,
Billings, MT, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Sam E. Haddon,
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-02-00089-SEH.
Before: O'SCANNLAIN, RYMER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
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Opinion
BYBEE, Circuit Judge.
Violet Bruce appeals her conviction for simple assault on an Indian child less than 16
years of age on a reservation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 113(a)(5). In her
sole claim of error, Bruce asserts that the case against her was brought under the
wrong statute. The government charged Bruce under § 1152, which covers offenses
committed in Indian country, but excepts crimes committed by an Indian against another
Indian. Bruce contends that she is an Indian. and the government should have charged
her under 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which covers certain offenses committed by an Indian in
Indian country. The district court denied her motion to dismiss on this ground. We
conclude that Bruce presented sufficient evidence that, if believed, established her
Indian status. We further hold that the court's error was not harmless. We therefore
reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In March 2002, Bruce, a resident of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in northeast
Montana. choked her five-year-old son, Cylus, and in so doing, bruised his face and
neck. On September 23, 2002, a grand jury indicted Bruce for assault on a child less
than 16 years of age on an Indian reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 113
(a)(5). The indictment stated, "That on or about March 25, 2002, at or near Wolf Point, in
the State and District of Montana, and within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck
Indian Reservation, being Indian country, the defendant, VIOLET BRUCE, did assault
another, an Indian person who had not attained the age of 16 years .. ., all in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 113(a)(5)." The indictment, thus, alleged that the victim was an
Indian person, but said nothing about Bruce's status.
Bruce admitted that she choked Cylus but, on her attorney's advice, she pied not guilty.
During the district court proceedings, Bruce repeatedly argued that she was Indian.
Before trial, she moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it should have been
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which applies to certain crimes by Indians, rather than

§ 1152, which excepts crimes by Indians against Indians. The court denied the motion.
At trial, Bruce's only defense was her claim of Indian status. At the close of the
government's case, Bruce again raised the argument in a motion for judgment of
acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, which the district court also denied. At the close of all
of the evidence, the court considered her Indian status defense at length. Bruce
introduced evidence that she is one-eighth Chippewa: that her mother is an *1218
enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe of Oklahoma; that she was born on an
Indian Reservation: that she currently lives on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation: that
two of her children are enrolled members of an Indian tribe; that she has been treated
by Poplar Indian Health Services and the Spotted Bull Treatment Center; that whenever
she was arrested it "had to have been [by] a tribal person"; and that she has been
arrested by tribal authorities "all her life." The district court concluded that, under§ 1152,
Bruce's Indian status was an affirmative defense on which Bruce had the burden of
production and that she had not borne this burden. Accordingly, the court declined to
submit the issue to the jury.
A jury convicted Bruce of violating § 1152 and the district court sentenced her to three
years' probation. Following her conviction, Bruce unsuccessfully moved to arrest the
judgment under Fed .R.Crim.P. 34 on the basis of her claimed Indian status. In support
of her motion, Bruce introduced additional evidence showing that in 1991 she was
treated as an Indian child by the Fort Peck Tribal Court, exercising jurisdiction pursuant
to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2004). After her motion was denied,
Bruce took this appeal.

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court's determination of Indian status under

18 U.S.C. § 1152 because it is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Eric
B., 86 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir.1996); United States

v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th

Cir.1996) (reviewing Indian status de novo ). Mixed questions of law and fact are those
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in which "the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of !aw is undisputed,
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard," Pu/Iman-Standard v.

Swint 456 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 I_.Ed.2d 66 (1982).
DISCUSSION

A. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country is a "complex
patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law," which is better explained by history than by
logic. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n. 1, 11 OS.Ct. 2053. 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990).
The historical background of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country can be traced
to colonial times, when Indian territory was entirely the province of the tribes and the
tribes were understood to possess jurisdiction over all persons and subjects present on
Indian lands. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
133 (2004 ). This policy continued until shortly after the ratification of the Constitution,
when Congress extended federal jurisdiction to non-Indians committing crimes against
Indians in Indian territory.1 Stat. 138 (1790); 1 Stat. 743 (1799); 2 Stat. 139 (1802).
Congress further extended criminal jurisdiction in 1817 to cover crimes committed by
Indians and non-Indians in Indian Country; notably, Congress excepted intra-Indian
offenses, or crimes in which both the victim and perpetrator were Indian. 3 Stat. 383
(1817),
The 1817 Act served as the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which is sometimes
called the Indian General Crimes Act ("IGCA"). Section 1152 makes federal enclave
criminal law-a concrete body of law governing areas within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States-generally applicable to crimes committed in "Indian
country," See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining "Indian country"). Section 1152 provides in full:
*1219 Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general iaws of the United

States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured
to the Indian tribes respectively.
In its original form, the IGCA ensured that federal criminal laws reached non-Indians
committing crimes in Indian country, while at the same time preserving the right of the
tribes to punish their own. See Oliphant

v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201,

98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978).
The IGCA excepts from federal criminal jurisdiction three categories of offenses that
might otherwise be thought to be within the jurisdiction of the tribes: "offenses committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian," offenses committed by
an Indian who has been punished by the tribe, and cases secured by treaty to the
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribe. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Although the "plain language" of§
1152 covers crimes in Indian country committed by non-Indians against non-Indians,
Mui! v. United States, 402 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1968), the Supreme Court has held

that states retain exclusive jurisdiction over general crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians in Indian country. Organized Viii. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68,
82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 66
S.Ct. 307. 90 L.Ed. 261 (1946); Draper v. United States. 164 U.S. 240, 17 S.Ct. 107, 41
L.Ed. 419 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 26 L.Ed. 869 (1881). Thus,
under the IGCA, the criminal laws of the United States apply to offenses committed in
Indian country by non-Indians against Indians and by Indians against non-Indians;
"[section] 1152 establishes federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes only." United
States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 97 4 (10th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (en bane).
The exception in the IGCA preserves the right of tribal courts to try ofienses committed
in Indian country by Indians against Indians, while recognizing that Indian tribes
generally do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195-206
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& n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 1011: see also 25 U.S.C_ § 1302(2)(recognizing "the inherent power of
Indian tribes ... to exercise criminal jurisdiciion over all Indians"). The Supreme Court
has interpreted the exception as manifesting a broad congressional respect for tribal
sovereignty in matters affecting only Indians. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602.
36 S.Ct. 699, 60 L.Ed. 1196 (1916) {broadly interpreting the intra-Indian offense
exception to extend to adultery involving an Indian participant).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct.
396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), which held that neither federal nor tribal courts had
jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of another Indian· on a reservation, Congress
revisited this policy. Congressional displeasure with the Crow Dog decision led to the
passage of a second statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, designed to establish as federal crimes,
fourteen named offenses committed by Indians in Indian country. See United Sia/es v.

Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, '1220444 U.S. 859, 100
S.CL '123, 62 L.Ed.2d 80 (1979). As relevant for our purposes,§ 1153 provides:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely ... an
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years ...
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2004), Enacted in 1885, the Indian Major Crimes Act ("IMCA")
guaranteed that Indians committing major crimes against other Indians would be treated
with the same rigor as non-Indian offenders. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203 & n. 4, 98
S.Ct. 1011. The IMCA, the Court has recognized, is a " 'carefully limited intrusion of
federal power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish
Indians for crimes committed on Indian land.'" United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
642-43 n. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (quoting Keeble v. United States.
412 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973)). 1 Assault against an
individual who has not attained the age of 16 years is one of the enumerated crimes that
the IMCA covers.
We have recognized that the "limited intrusion'' on Indian sovereignty in the IMCA is
itself confined to federal enclave law. In United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498(9th
Cir.1994), we rejected the claim "that Indians may not be charged for any criminal
conduct beyond those crimes enumerated in [the Indian Major Crimes Act]." We
concluded that the !MCA only concerns "the application of federal enclave law to Indians
and has no bearing on federal laws of nationwide applicability that make actions criminal
wherever committed." Id. (citing United Stales

v. Top Sky. 547 F.2d 433, 434(9th

Cir.1976)). Thus, we held that federal criminal laws of general, nationwide applicabilitysuch as the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S,C, § 371-apply to Indians unless a treaty
specifically exempts them. Id. at 499(citing United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117
(9th Cir.1975)).
Despite these intrusions, tribal courts retain jurisdiction to punish certain crimes
occurring in Indian country. However, under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1301 et al. ("ICRA"), tribal courts may not impose punishment greater than a year's
imprisonment or a $5,000 fine, or both. Id. § 1302(7). Tribal courts may generally punish
offenses committed by members of the tribe and may prosecute misdemeanors against
Indians who are not members of that tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2); see also United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 1636, 1639. i 58 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004) (rejecting a
challenge to the ICRA Amendment and upholding the authority of Congress to "permit
tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute non-member
Indians," but declining to reach the question of "whether the Constitution's Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses prohibit tribes from prosecuting a non-member citizen of
the United States."). Because the tribe's jurisdiction stems from its inherent authority,
rather than federal delegation, successive prosecution by a *1221 tribe and the federal
government does not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the two are dual
sovereigns. Id at 1639. Nonetheless, Congress has statutorily forbidden a successive
prosecution in federal court brought pursuant to § 1152 after the tribe has imposed
punishment for the offense. 18 U .S.C. § 1152.
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in addition to federal and tribal jurisdiction, there are statutes in which Congress has
"unambiguously confer[red] jurisdiction on the State over major offenses committed by
or against Indians on Indian reservations." Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, ·110, 113
S.Ct. 1119, 122 L.Ed.2d 457 (1993) (construing The Kansas Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3243),
Aside from statutory grants, the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in McBratney,
104 U.S. at 624, is to recognize state jurisdiction for crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians on Indian territory,
We can summarize these rules concerning criminal jurisdiction in Indian country as
follows:

1. Crimes in which both the perpetrator and victim are Indian are subject to (a) federal
jurisdiction under§ 1153 if the crime charged is one of the fourteen enumerated
crimes (and conviction may extend to lesser included offenses), or if the federal
statute is one of general applicability; (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by
Congress; and (c) tribal jurisdiction, perhaps running concurrent with either federal or
state jurisdiction, although punishment is limited to no more than one year and
$5,000.
2. Crimes in which the perpetrator, but not the victim, is Indian are subject to (a)
federal jurisdiction under§ 1152(except where the tribe has already imposed
punishment or the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction through treaty), or§ 1153(if the
crime is one of the fourteen enumerated crimes, with conviction perhaps extending to
lesser included offenses), and pursuant to federal criminal laws of general
applicability; (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress; and (c) tribal
jurisdiction, perhaps running concurrently with either federal or state jurisdiction,
although punishment is limited to no more than one year and $5,000. 2
3. Crimes in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian are subject to (a)
federal jurisdiction under§ 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal laws of
general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress.
4. Crimes in which both the perpetrator and victim are non-Indian are subject to
state jurisdiction or federal criminal laws of general applicability.:,
See United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1231 n. 11 (9th Cir.1980); JULIE
WREND & CLAY SMITH, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 99-100 (1998).
We note that the complex scheme established by Congress creates obvious gaps in
federal jurisdiction to punish crimes in Indian country. For example, a non-Indian may be
charged under§ 1152 when the victim is an Indian; if his victim is a non- *1222 Indian,
he generally must be charged under state law. An Indian may be charged with a host of
federal crimes under§ 1152 if his victim is a non-Indian, but generally only with major
crimes under§ 1153 if his victim is an Indian. See Antelope. 430 U.S. at 646-47. 97
S.Ct : 395(rejecting an Equal Protection challenge to§ 1153).
The one point that emerges with clarity from this otherwise bewildering maze of rules is
that the question of who is an Indian bears significant legal consequences. Importantly,
from a defendant's perspective, unless state jurisdiction is specifically authorized by
Congress, or he is charged pursuant to a generally applicable federal criminal statute,
an Indian person charged with committing a crime against another Indian person that is
not listed in § 1153 is subject only to the jurisdiction of the tribe: the offender may only
be punished for up to one year or fined $5,000, or both. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7), Once an
Indian person is punished by a tribe for an offense covered by§ 1152, federal courts
may no longer impose any punishment for that offense. Thus, Indian status carries
certain benefits in the context of federal criminal adjudications.
Indian status also bears significance independent of criminal jurisdiction. The host of
federal statutes and service programs designed to benefit Indians are rife with statusbased classifications used to designate the special position of a formerly sovereign
people. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646, 97 S.Ct. 1395; FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 19(1982 ed.). These include, to name a few, the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301; the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, id. § 1601; the
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!nd!an Education Act, jd. § 1001; the Indian Alcohol Substance Abuse Act id. § 2403(3);
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, id. § 1901. See Morton v. Mancari. 417 U.S. 535, 552,
94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) ("Literally every piece of legislation dealing with
Indian tribes and reservations ... single[s] out for special treatment a constituency of
tribal Indians living on or near reservations."), Accordingly, some commentators have
even gone so far as to characterize Indian status as a "property interest." See GAIL K.
SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN: THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT OF
1990, at 138 (1997). Although the requirements may vary depending upon the purpose
for which Indian status is claimed, courts cannot be ignorant of the collateral
consequences their rulings might have in future proceedings. It is against the backdrop
of these formal and functional considerations that we must discern the precise
relationship between §§ 1152 and 1153-the two bifurcated statutory remnants of a
complicated jurisdictional history.

B. Indian Status·as a Defense to§ 1152
Bruce contends that, because she and her victim are both Indians, her indictment
should have been brought pursuant to § 1153, rather than § 1152. In order to resolve
this contention, we must first determine what effect one's claimed Indian status has in a
prosecution brought pursuant to § 1152.
3

In United States

v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir.1983), we held that "the

Government need not allege the non-Indian status of the defendant in an indictment
under section 1152, nor does it have the burden of going forward on that issue." id. at
1043. Rather, ''[o]nce the defendant properly raises the issue of his Indian status, then
the ultimate burden of proof remains ... upon the Government." id. (citing United States

v. Guess. 629 F.2d 573, 577 n. 4 (9th Cir.1980)). Section 1152 thus requires that Bruce
not only raise her Indian status but also that she carry the burden of production for that
issue: Indian '1223 status, after Hester, is in the nature of an affirmative defense. To
satisfy her burden, Bruce must come forward with enough evidence of her Indian status
to permit a fact-finder to decide the issue in her favor. No court has yet specified the
quantum of evidence that must be offered in order to satisfy this production burden.
Nonetheless, once she meets this burden, the government retains the ultimate burden
of persuasion-or "the obligation to persuade the trier of fact of the truth of [the]
proposition," Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep'f' of Labor v. Greenwich

Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 268, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 129 l.Ed.2d 221 (1994)-that the
exception she claims is inapplicable. See Martin

v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237, 107 S.Ct.

1098, 94 l.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that "when an affirmative
defense does negate an element of the crime ... the state [must] prove the nonexistence
of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis in original) (citing In re WinsNp,
397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197. 207-09 & nn. 10-11. 97 S.Ct. 2319. 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (noting that "the trend
over the years appears to have been to require the prosecution to disprove affirmative
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt"); Guess, 629 F.2d at 577 n. 4 (explaining the
general rule that "once a criminal defendant satisfies his burden of production with
respect to an affirmative defense, the prosecution must prove the inapplicability of this
defense beyond a reasonable doubt").
Bruce argues that the district court erred by refusing to submit the issue of her Indian
statu_s to the jury because she presented enough evidence to meet her burden of
production. The government responds that Bruce did not meet her burden, or
alternately, that, assuming Bruce is Indian, the prosecution under§ 1152 was harmless
because her conduct was equally illegal under§ 1153.
C. Determining Who Is an "Indian"

4

5

The term "Indian" is not statutorily defined, but courts have "judicially

explicated" its me·aning. Broncheau. 597 F.2d al 1263. The generally accepted test for
Indian status considers" '(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or government
recognition as an Indian.'" United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758,761 (9th Cir.1996)
(quoting Bronc/?eau, 597 F.2d at 1263); see also United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 567,573, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846) (interpreting the meaning of"lndian" under the
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, the precursor of the Major Crimes Act, not to apply
to a white man who had been adopted into the Cherokee tribe).

A person claiming
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Indian status must satisfy both prongs. The first prong requires ancestr; living in
America before the Europeans arrived, but this fact is obviously rarely provable as such.

See CANBY, supra, at 9. Because the general requirement is only of "some" blood,
evidence of a parent, grandparent. or great-grandparent who is clearly identified as an
Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy this prong. Id.; see also Vezina v. United States,
245 F. 411 (8th Cir.1917) (women 1/4 to 3/8 Chippewa Indian held to be Indian); Sully

v.

Uniteci States, 195 F. 113 (8th Cir.1912) (118 Indian blood held sufficient to be Indian);
St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D.1988) (15/32 of Yankton
Sioux blood sufficient *1224 to satisfy the first requirement of having a degree of Indian
blood); Goforth

v. State. 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okia.Crirr.App.1982) (requirement of

Indian blood satisfied by testimony that person was slightly less than one-quarter
Cherokee Indian); Makah Indian Tribe

v. Clallam County, 73 Wash.2d 677 440 P.2d

442 (1968) (114 Makah blood sufficient to satisfy Indian blood requirement).
6

The second prong of the test-tribal orfederal government recognition as an Indian

-"probes whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a formerly
sovereign peopie." St. Ctoud. 702 F.Supp. at 1461. When analyzing this prong, courts
have considered, in declining order of importance, evidence of the following: "1) tribal
enrollment; 2) government recognition formally and informally through receipt of
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and
4) social recognition as an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in
Indian social life." United States v. Lawrence. 51 F.3d 150. 152 (8th Cir.1995) (citing St.
Cloud, 702 F.Supp. at 1461 ).
Bruce presented evidence to establish both her Indian blood and recognition. With
respect to Indian blood, she offered evidence that she is one-eighth Chippewa Indian
and introduced a certificate of Indian blood confirming this fact. She also offered
evidence that her mother is an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe of
Oklahoma, and that two of Bruce's children are enrolled members of an Indian tribe.,;
With respect to recognition, she presented evidence that she was born on an Indian
reservation and currently lives on one; that she participates in Indian religious
ceremonies; that she has, on several occasions, been treated at Indian hospitals; and
that she was "arrested tribal" all her life.
7

The district court, applying the two-part test for determining Indian status,

concluded that Bruce had provided evidence to establish the first prong, her Indian
blood. Her status, therefore, turned on whether a tribe or the federal government had
recognized her as an Indian. The district court cited the fact that she was not enrolled in
a tribe and failed to present evidence that the federal government had recognized her to
be an Indian. On the basis of this evidence, it found that Bruce had not met her burden
on this prong and concluded that she had not satisfied her burden of production as to
the affirmative defense.
We disagree. Tribal enrollment is "the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian
status, but it is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative." Broncheau, 597
F.2d at 1263; accord Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1395 ("[E]nrollment in an
official tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction .... ")
(citations omitted); Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 ("While tribal enrollment is one means of
establishing status as an 'Indian' under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. it is not the sole means of
proving such status.") (citation omitted);

Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir.1938)

("The lack of enrollment ... is not determinative of status .... [T]he refusal of the
Department of Interior to enroll a certain Indian as a member of a certain tribe is not
necessarily an administrative determination that the person is not an Indian."); St.

Cloud, 702 F.SL1pp. at 1461 ("[A] person may still be an Indian though not enrolled with
a recognized tribe."), Nor have we required evidence of federal recognition. Rather, we
have emphasized that there

'1225 must be some evidence of government or tribal

recognition. See Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 (concluding that where child was shown to have
Indian blood and was treated by tribe as a member of the tribe, district court properly
found that she was an Indian); accord

Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31; Lewis v. State. 137

Idaho 882, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Ct.App.2001 ), This stems. from the recognition that one of
an Indian tribe's most basic powers is the authority to determine questions of its own
membership. See Santa Clan:.-1 Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670,
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56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); United

es v. Wheeler, 435 U S. 313. 322 n. 1

s. 98 S.Ct.

1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978); Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 27 S.Ct. 29,
51 L.Ed. 96 (1906); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 18 S.Ct. 60, 42 L.Ed. 442 (1897).
Motivated in part by equal protection concerns, the dissent proposes a new test for
determining Indian status; one that would conflate our two-pronged Rogers inquiry and
multifaceted "recognition" guidelines into a single question: whether the individual is
enrolled or eligible for enrollment in a federally recognized tribe. From a purely
conceptual standpoint, we agree that eligibility for enrollment provides a simpler
framework within which we might judge Indian status as a political affiliation with a
formerly sovereign people. Nonetheless, it is not the test that we have adopted. and
until either Congress acts or the Supreme Court or an en bane panel of our court
revises the "recognition" prong of the Rogers test. _we are bound by our prior
jurisprudence. In particular, we are bound by the body of case law which holds that
enrollment, and, indeed, even eligibility therefor, is not dispositive of Indian status.

Broncheau_. 597 F .2d at 1263; Keys, 103 F.3d at 761. In sum, we are not permitted to
hold that these cases do not mean what they say. c
Consequently, we find United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, particularly instructive.
Keys, a non-Indian, was charged under§ 1152 with assault of his daughter. who
possessed one-fourth Indian blood. Keys argued that the government had failed to
prove that his daughter, who was not enrolled. was an Indian (presumably on the theory
that after McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624, assault committed by a non-Indian against a nonIndian victim could be charged under state law, but not under§ 1152). The magistrate
found that the tribal court had exercised jurisdiction over Keys's daughter. and that she
had been provided medical services by an Indian hospital. The magistrate concluded
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that, under such *1226 circumstances. she was a "de facto
member" of the tribe. Id. at 760. Without considering whether she was eligible for
enrollment, we concluded t_hat her Indian status was "amply demonstrated." Id. at 761 . 7
Because of the procedural posture of the case with which we are presented, we are not
required to decide whether Bruce conclusively established that she was an Indian.
Rather, we must merely determine whether she brought forward enough evidence of
tribal recognition to permit her defense to be heard by the jury. We conclude that she
did.
Bruce produced evidence that she had participated in sacred tribal rituals, including at
least one sweat lodge ritual; that she was born on an Indian Reservation and continues
to reside on one; that two of her children are enrolled members of an Indian tribe; and
that she has been treated by Poplar Indian Health Services and the Spotted Bull
Treatment Center. More significantly, her mother testified that whenever she was
arrested it ''had to have been [by] a tribal person" and that she h_as been arrested by
tribal authorities "all her life." The precise testimony was as follows:

0. When Violet was young, did she have issues or problems with the tribal
authorities?
A. Not really. But she was arrested tribal all her life.

Q. Well, that's what I want to talk about. What does that mean that she was "arrested
tribal"?
A. She got out of hand and someone had to come and get her. arrest her. And it had

to have been a tribal person.

Q. And that would be drinking behavior and such?
A. Yeah. Fighting with her sister.
Q. Now, the tribal authorities would step in and take charge of the situation?

A. Yes.
Q. And did that involve dealing with the tribal authorities?

A. Yes.
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0. And was Violet treated as an Indian person during those times?
A. Yes.

0. By the tribe?
A. Yes.e

*1227This testimony is significant because, as we have discussed, the tribe has no
jurisdiction to punish anyone but an Indian. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7); Oliphant. 435 U.S. at
191, 98 S.Ct. 1011.
In sum, Bruce brought forward testimony to establish that she was "arrested tribal" her
entire life and that whenever she had a brush with the law it had to be with tribal
authorities. Although not introduced as artfully by her counsel as it could have been,
Bruce has put the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction on the table, and, in so doing,
raised strong evidence of tribal recognition. The assumption and exercise of a tribe's
criminal jurisdiction, while not conclusive evidence of Indian status, significantly bolsters
the argument that Bruce met her burden of producing sufficient evidence upon which a
jury might rationally conclude that she was an Indian.
We caution that Bruce was only required to meet a production burden. When combined
with the testimony as to her one-eighth Chippewa blood line, the cumulative effect of the
additional evidence of tribal recognition does at least that. To decline to find sufficient
evidence of Indian status on these facts is to shift the burden to the defense. Bruce's
burden is one of mere production.
Accordingly, we hold that Bruce brought forward sufficient evidence that, if believed,
would permit a jury rationally to conclude that Bruce was Indian. 8
D. Harmless Error
8

Having determined that the court erred in declining to submit the issue of Bruce's

Indian status to the jury, we must now determine whether that error was harmless. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("Any error ... that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded."). The government argues that it makes no difference whether a jury could
have concluded that Bruce was Indian because that would only mean that her conduct
violated § 1153, rather than § 1152. Effectively, the government argues that because
her victim was an Indian, her crime must be chargeable under either§ 1152 or§ 1153,
and Bruce's Indian status is therefore irrelevant. Although the government's argument
finds some support in the cases examining this issue, we find these cases
distinguishable and the argument unpersuasive.
In Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.1970), modified, 434 F.2d 1283 (9th
Cir.1971 ), we concluded that when an indictment charged a violation of§ 1152 but the
government actually prosecuted the case under§ 1153, the error was harmless. In
Henry, the indictment listed § 1152 but alleged that the defendant was Indian. See
Henry. 432 F .2d at 117-18. The court instructed the jury that the defendant's Indian

status was an element of the offense, and the jury found that the government had
proven that the defendant was Indian beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Although the
indictment read§ 1152. the defendant was in all other respects prosecuted under§
1153, and not § 1152. Thus, Henry dealt with little more than a scrivener's error.
In United States v. Heat/1. 509 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1974 ), we concluded that an indictment
under§ 1153, alleging that both the victim and the defendant were Indian, was *1228
sufficient to support a conviction under§ 1152. The facts in Heath were quite unusual.
Heath had initially stipulated that she was an Indian (which would have subjected her to
§ 1153); however, on appeal she argued that, by act of Congress, the Klamath tribe was
dissolved, and she was no longer entitled to claim Indian status at the time of her
offense. See 25 U.S.C. § 564q (2004). We agreed that she was no longer an Indian, but
held that the error in the indictment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 20.
In reaching this conclusion, considerable emphasis was placed on Heath's pre-trial
stipulation that she was an Indian, id. at 20 n. 4, as well as the indictment's proper
reference to the victim's Indian status, which, given the termination of Heath's Indian
status, was a pre-requisite for her conviction under§ 1152. Id. at 20. Moreover, as

r1n,,..._, ... ,_,,
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Heath clearly implies, a denial o ndian status operates as a jurisdictional clement

under§ 1153, which is generally resolved by a judge, rather than an affirmative
defense, which must be submitted to the jury after the defendant carries his production
burden. 10 Importantly, however, in neither Henry nor Heath was the question of Indian
status contested at trial.
While other circuits have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances,
only one case involved an objection timely filed. In United States v. Wt7ite Horse, 316
F.3d 769 (8th Cir.2003), the Eighth Circuit held that a charge brought under§ 1152
rather than§ 1153 was not plainly erroneous because "[b]etween them, the statutes
apply to all defendants whatever their race or ethnicity." id. at 772-73; see also id. at
772 (noting that objection was not raised at trial), The Tenth Circuit in Prentiss, 256 F.3d
971, concluded that, although the Indian/non-Indian status of the victim and defendant
are.essential elements of§ 1152 crimes which must be alleged in the indictment, the
failure of the indictment to allege those elements was harmless error. See a/so id. at
983 (reasoning that the indictment should be construed liberally because the
defendant's challenge was belated). In United States v. John, 587 F.2d 683, 688 (5th
Cir.1979), the Fifth Circuit, without commenting on the timeliness of the motion,
concluded that an indictment's erroneous reliance on § 1153, rather than § 1152, was
harmless where the applicable federal enclave law was also referenced such that it was
"clear that the indictment asserted jurisdiction under§ 1152 as an unstated premise."
Close examination demonstrates that none of these cases involves a timely challenge to
a prosecution both instituted and actually conducted pursuant to the wrong statute. Yet,
their reasoning is alluring because Bruce-who does not dispute that she committed the
underlying act of choking her child-is guilty under either§ 1152 or § 1153; either she is
an Indian or she is not. See White Horse, 316 F.3d at 773, Given all of the evidence
offered at trial, the conclusion that the district court reached the "correct result" despite
its error seems almost inescapable. See, e.g., United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d
915, 920 (2d Cir.1945) (Frank, J., dissenting) (famously characterizing this approach to
harmless error review as follows: "If we, sitting on a reviewing court, believe, from
merely reading the record, that a defendant is guilty, then we ... hold that an error ...
even if it may seriously have *1229 prejudiced the jury against the defendant, is to be
regarded as 'harmless.'").
9

Nonetheless, this logic belies harmless error scrutiny. In reviewing

nonconstitutional error on direct appeal under Rule 52(a), we adhere to the analysis first
provided by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct.
1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); see a/so Brechtv. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113
S,Ct, 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (reaffirming the Kotteakos standard); United States

v. Brooke. 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that the standard for
nonconstitutional error on direct review is governed by Kotteakos ). In rejecting the
premise underlying the "correct result" approach-namely, that a defendant has not been
harmed by error if he should have been convicted in any event-Kotteakos reaffirmed a
touchstone principle of appellate review: "[l]t is not the appellate court's function to
determine guilt or innocence. Nor is it to speculate upon probable reconviction and
decide according to how the speculation comes out.... Those judgments are exclusively
for the jury." Kolleakos, 328 U.S. at 763, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (citations omitted). Instead,
Kotteakos offered the following standard:

If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand .. ,, But if one cannot say, with fair assurance,
after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action
from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the
error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not
affected,
Id. at 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239. The Court emphasized that whether "conviction would, or
might probably, have resulted in properly conducted trial is not the criterion"; rather, we

are merely to inquire whether "the error had substantia I and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jwy's verdict." Id. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (emphasis added),

OU03'5c'
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Using this framework, it is clear that our answer to the question of what would have
happened without the error should not be based on our own satisfaction with the verdict,
or even whether the evidence was suffici,ent for the jury to have reached the same
verdict absent the error. The issue, rather, is what the jury actually would have done
without the error. See WAYNER. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 27.6(b) (2d ed.1999). It is against this backdrop that we
judge the harm caused to Bruce by the trial court's erroneous decision to prevent Bruce
from reaching the jury on the question of her Indian status.
We note that Congress has set forth, in §§ 1152 and 1153, two different mechanisms for
asserting federal criminal jurisdiction. We have previously concluded that the
defendant's Indian status is an essential element of a § 1153 offense which the
government must allege in the indictment and prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See
United Stales v. James, 980 F.2d 131_4, 1317-19 (9th Cir.1992) (concluding that where

the defendant challenges the indictment before trial, the failure to allege Indian status is
fatal to an indictment under§ 1153); Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262 (implying that the
defendant's Indian status is one of the "necessary elements" to be proven by the
government ·1n a§ 1153 prosecut'1on). Our conclusion that Bruce met her burden of
production under§ 1152 implies a finding that the jury could rationally acquit on the
basis that the government failed to disprove her claimed Indian status. This does not
equate to a finding that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
Bruce is Indian, as required by§ 1153. By prosecuting Bruce under§ 1152, rather than
§ 1153, the government did not '1230 have to prove that Bruce was an Indian. In so
doing, the government released itself of its obligation to prove an element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's error was, thus, not anymore harmless than
a failure to prove that the victim was indeed a child under the age of 16. Absent proof of
Bruce's Indian status, there is no federal crime under § 1153.
Moreover, were we to find harmless error in this case-where the defendant has objected
from the outset that she could not be charged under§ 1152-we would have merged the
two statutes into one. We would be inviting the government to charge under either
statute, calculating that one of the provisions is likely to apply. This is not without
consequences. Because § 1152 requires proof of fewer elements, the government
would always have an incentive to indict under that section, thereby shifting the costs of
producing evidence of Indian status to the defendant.
Furthermore, as we have discussed, Bruce's status as an Indian ve/ non has
consequences for any future prosecutions, and may also have collateral consequences
in future non-criminal hearings where Indian status is at issue. To offer a single
example, prior tribal punishment, as noted previously, is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution instituted pursuant to § 1152. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (stating that "[t]his
section shall not extend to ... any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe ... "). Were we to find harmless error
in this case, it is not clear on what basis this affirmative defense could ever be raised in
a prosecution brought against an Indian person under§ 1152, so long as the crime
could have been charged under§ 1153. In sum, we simply cannot conclude. based
upon the record, that the district court's error did not have a prejudicial effect on the
outcome of the proceeding. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S .Ct. 1239.
We note, however, that this statutory framework creates an obvious and troubling
conundrum. It is entirely probable that the government may be simultaneously unable
either to prove or disprove a claim of Indian status, effectively foreclosing conviction
under either statute. This is especially likely given that the burden of proof required for a
defendant to place Indian status at issue in a § 1152 case may be as low as a
preponderance, whereas the burden of proof required for the government to both
disprove Indian status under§ 1152 and to prove Indian status under§ 1153 is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. We are also aware of the additional expenditure of
government resources required to reindict Bruce under a different provision and to retry
her with the same evidence, but we decline to challenge the government's charging
decision. See Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 986 n. 14. Judicial correction of indictments that
erroneously misrepresent a defendant's Indian status presents the possibility of future

https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5e26959479ecl ld99c4dbb2f0352441dNiew/FullTe...

6/7/2011

adverse collateral consequences outside the criminal context, and lmpropedy shifts the
burden of proof otherwise applicable to the parties within the criminal arena.
In addition, where indictment is required, judicial correction of this sort serves to usurp
the uniquely protective role of the grand jury. 11 The Fifth Amendment vests the grand
jury with responsibility *1231 for determining "whether there is probable cause to believe
a crime has been committed and[for] ... protect[ing] ... citizens against unfounded
criminal prosecutions." United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338,343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38
L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). The grand jury is part of the prosecutorial process, Batz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478,510, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), and we may not

direct its activities. See United Stales v. Dionisio, 41 O U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35
L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). Accordingly, we may not presume to correct the decisions of the
grand jury by altering the sections charged under the United States Code, except
through our judgments, any more than we can, except through our judgments, correct
the prosecutorial decisions of the executive. See United S1ates v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,
47-50, 112 S.Ct.1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352(1992); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454,
457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1868).
While we are not ignorant of the troublesome nature of our judgment, we remain bound
by the language and structure of these two statutes. The federal crimes at issue here
"are solely creatures of statute," Stapies v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,604, 114 S.Ct.
1793, 128 L.Ed .2d 608 ( 1994). Subject to constitutional limitations not implicated here,
Congress-not a federal appellate court-is authorized to define the elements of a federal
criminal offense. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,689 & n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63
L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). It is likewise up to Congress to correct any awkwardness in the
interrelation of the acts it promulgates. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings
consistent with this decision.
RYivlER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I part company because until now, no one has ever held that an adult may be an Indian
(for purposes of legal status, not for purposes of ethnicity) when she is neither enrolled
as a member of a tribe nor eligible for membership, nor entitled to tribal or government
benefits to which only Indians are entitled; our law does not require us to allow Bruce to
put her legal status as an Indian into play-and thus to shift the burden to the government
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she is

not an

Indian-in the absence of any

evidence that she is at least eligible for tribal membership or recognition; and it makes
no sense to do so, for the majority's contrary rule allows Bruce, on the same set of facts,
to be both an Indian (who cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1152) and not an
Indian (who cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
The facts are undisputed. The evidence shows that:
• Bruce's mother, who is enrolled in the Turtle Mountain Tribe, is Indian
• Bruce is one-eighth Chippewa
• Bruce currently lives on the reservation of the Fort Peck Tribe
• Bruce associates with Indian persons
• Bruce has three children, two of whom are Indian and are enrolled in a tribe
• Bruce engaged in one sweat lodge (a ceremony that has religious significance)
*1232 • Bruce was "arrested tribal all her life" 1
There is no evidence:
• that Bruce is an enrolled member of any tribe
• that Bruce is recognized as a tribe member by any tribe or the federal government
• that Bruce enjoys any benefits of tribal affiliation
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'"that Bruce is eligible for tribai membership
• that Bruce has voted in tribal elections, that she has held tribal office, that she has
served on tribal juries, that she has received payments or allotments made only to
Indians, or that she is employed by a tribal organization.
I agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, this evidence does not permit a
jury to find that Bruce has legal status as an Indian.
The Federal Enclave Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, provides for the prosecution of crimes
committed in Indian country by non-Indians against Indians, but its coverage does not
extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian;§ 1153, in turn, provides that an Indian who commits certain major crimes
against the person or property of another Indian may be prosecuted under the general
laws of the United States. Neither section defines "Indian." However, courts generally
follow the Rogers test, 2 which considers "(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or
government recognition as an Indian." United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th
Cil'.1996). We have held that the defendant's legal status as a non-Indian is not an
element or an essential jurisdictional fact that must be charged in an indictment under§
1152. United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.1983). Rather, as we
explained in adopting the burden-shifting framework that controls§ 1152 prosecutions
and this case,
[i]t is far more manageable for the defendant to shoulder the burden of producing
evidence that he is a member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the

Government to produce evidence that he is not a member of any one of the hundreds
of such tribes. We accordingly hold that the Government need not allege the nonIndian status of the defendant in an indictment under section 1152, nor does it have
the burden of going forward on that issue. Once the defendant properly raises the
issue of his Indian status, then the ultimate burden of proof remains, of course, upon
the Government.

Id. at 1043 (emphasis added).
While we have stated in different contexts that enrollment is not the exclusive way to
show that one is Indian, 3 we have *1233 recognized that tribal membership is the
common thread and evidentiary means of establishing Indian status. See Broncheau,
597 F.2d at 1263(observing this, and noting that the defendant admitted he was enrolled
and never suggested he did not understand the term "Indian" as it applied to him). So
far as I can tell, no court has ever held that an adult could have Indian legal status who
was neither enrolled or eligible for enrollment, nor entitled to tribal or government
benefits due only to Indians. 4 Indeed, enrollment-or at a minimum, ,.1234 eligibility for
enrollment-may be constitutionally required to avoid equal protection problems because
otherwise, enforcement of federal criminal laws would arguably be based on an
impermissible racial classification. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646. 97 S.CL 1395(holding
that there was no constitutional problem because defendants were not subjected to
federal criminal jurisdiction under§ 1153 on account of their Indian race, but because
they are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe); Kt~ys, 103 F.3d at 761 (noting
that Antelope had upheld prosecution on equal protection grounds because "the term
'Indian' describes a political group or membership, not a racial group"),
It is difficult to fathom what the "recognition" prong of Rogers means if not enrollment or
eligibility for enrollment in a tribe, or receipt of tribal or federal benefits to which only
Indians are entitled. Indian ties cannot be enough, because one can have ties without
legal status. As the Supreme Court observed in Duro v. Reina, "[m]any non-Indians
reside on reservations, and have close ties to tribes through marriage or long
employment. Indeed, the population of non-Indians on reservations generally is greater
than the population of all Indians, ..." 495 U.S. 676,695,110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d
693 (1990).
But if-as the majority holds-ties are enough for purposes of§ 1152, no reason of logic,
linguistics, or grammar suggests that ties should not also be enough for purposes of§
1153." Yet clearly they are not. To the contrary, we have held for purposes of§ 1153
that a terminated Klamath Indian is no longer an Indian because she lost her Indian

<', ·- C'
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legal status upon termination. United $/Atr;s v. Heat/1, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir.197/4);
Hester. 719 F.2d at 1043 n. 2 (so noting). If that is so, then it makes no sense for an

Indian who has never had tribal membership and is ineligible for it to have legal status
as an Indian. A court cannot rationally hold that both things are true.
United Sia/es v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.1996), which the majority points to as

"instructive," op. at 1225, is different. There, the question of Indian status arose with
respect to a two-year old girl who was not enrolied in the Tribe. However, we decided
that her lack of enrollment did not control the determination of her Indian status because
she could not have enrolled herself. her mother was an enrolled member of the
Colorado River Indian Tribe, the girl had one-quarter Colorado River Indian blood, the
girl's custody was litigated in the Colorado River Indian Tribal Court which exercised
jurisdiction over her and continued to do so at the time of the *1235 federal action, and
the allegations that formed the gravamen of the federal prosecution were investigated
by Colorado River Indian police. Id. at 761. Bruce's situation differs because she is an
adult who could have enrolled herself (if she were eligible);she has one-eighth
Chippewa blood (which is not the bloodline of the Ford Peck tribes), and she was not
under the jurisdiction of any tribal court at the time of the federal action.
In sum, the district court got the test right, correctly construed the facts in the light most
favorable to Bruce, and concluded that, as a matter of law, the evidence adduced by
Bruce does not permit a reasonable inference that she has Indian legal status. Applying
the Rogers test, the district court acknowledged evidence of some Indian blood
possessed by Bruce. This evidence shows that she is one-eighth Chippewa, but there is
no evidence that this meets the quantum of blood requirement for recognition by that
tribe. As Judge Canby notes in his Nutshell, tribes have different blood requirements for
enrollment; many require one-fourth tribal blood, and at least one requires five-eighths. 6
William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshe/110 (4th ed.2003). Regardless,
there is no evidence that Bruce is enrolled as a member of the Turtle Mountain Tribewhere her mother is enrolled-or of the Sioux or Assiniboine tribes which are the two
tribes at Ford Peck, where Bruce now lives, or of any Chippewa tribe. There is no
evidence that she is eligible for membership. There is no evidence that Bruce holds
herself out as Indian; although she enrolled two of her three children, she has not
enrolled (or for all that appears, ever tried to enroll) herself.
This indicates that she either knows that she cannot be a tribal member, or does not
wish to identify herself as one. There is no evidence that she has received benefits,
payments, or allotments to which only an Indian is entitled. Nor is there any evidence
that Bruce has taken part in tribal affairs by voting, serving on juries, or holding office.
There is no evidence that Fort Peck has been involved in her life in a significant enough
way to constitute recognition; and conversely, visiting a sweat lodge with her mother on
one occasion does not manifest participation in Indian life or heritage to any substantial
extent. The only evidence of Bruce's legal status as an Indian comes from the fact that
her mother is an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe, Bruce was "arrested
tribal," was married for a time to an Indian, has two enrolled children, lives on the Fort
Peck reservation (which is home to tribes with which she has no blood relationship), and
socializes with others on the reservation because of her children. This could well be true
of a lot of people, for many non-Indians live on Indian reservations, where they too get
in trouble, socialize with Indians, marry Indians, and have children who are recognized
as Indian. These facts alone do not raise an inference that Bruce has been recognized
by any tribe or the government.
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Bruce failed to produce sufficient
evidence to support a finding that she has legal status as an Indian. I would not cut a
new path that allows someone to ''1236 have the legal status of an Indian, and not an
Indian, on the same set of facts that does not include enrollment, eligibility for
enrollment, or entitlement to Indian benefits as a common denominator. I therefore
dissent.

Parallel Citations
05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 379, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 505
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Footnotes
The scope of the statute was expanded significantly by the Supreme
Court's decision in Keeble, which held that an Indian charged pursuant to
the IMCA was entitled to request and receive instructions as to lesser and
included offenses if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find him
guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. Id. at 208-09; see
also United Stales v. John., 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir.1979) (upholding
conviction on lesser and included offense); accord Felicia v. United States,
495 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.1974).
2

Offenses committed by Indians against multiple victims, including both
Indians and others, would fall subject to competing, and perhaps
concurrent, claims of federal, state and tribal jurisdiction, although
presumably a federal court could not impose punishment for an offense
covered by § 1152 after a tribal court had done so.

3

Offenses committed by non-Indians against multiple victims, including both
Indians and others, would fall subject to competing, and perhaps
concurrent, claims of federal and state court jurisdiction,

4

The Indian Civil Rights Act does not define "Indian" but begs the question
by defining an Indian as "any person who would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, title 18,
[United States Code] if that person were to commit an offense listed in that
section in Indian country to which that section applies." 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4)
(2004),

5

The presentence report, perhaps accepting her vouching uncritically, listed
her race as "American Indian."

6

We note, in addition, that unenrolled Indians are eligible for a wide range of
federal benefits directed to persons recognized by the Secretary of Interior
as Indians without statutory reference to enrollment. For example, The
Native American Programs Act of 1974, creating the Administration for
Native Americans, operates under regulations with a very broad definition
of Indian: "any individual who claims to be an Indian and who is regarded
as such by the Indian community in which he or she lives or by the Indian
community of which he or she claims to be a part," 45 C.F.R. § 1336.1
(1989): see a/so Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. §
1603(c)(member of a tribe including those terminated and those recognized
in the future; descendent in first or second degree of a member: and
anyone "determined to be an Indian under regulations promulgated by the
Secretary"); Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(1)
(1994), 25 U.S.C. § 305e(d)(2) (1994) (defining "Indian" as "any individual
who is a member of an Indian tribe;

or for the purposes of this

section is

certified as an Indian artisan by an Indian tribe") (emphasis added);
ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 84 (3d ed. 1991) ("Beginning with the Non-Intercourse Acts of
the late 1700s and through enactment of the 1934 Indian Reorganization
Act, federal law has treated 'Indians' as a class without regard to proof of
tribal enrollment").
7

See also United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 787 (8th Cir.1976)

(concluding that defendant, Manuel M. Alvarado, was an Indian for
purposes of § 1153, based merely on evidence that he possessed onefourth Yurok Indian blood and, at one time, he filed·an application to be
recognized as a member of the Yurok Tribe on the California State
Judgment Rolls; the court stated: Alvarado possessed "Indian blood and []
held [himself] out to be [an] Indian[]"); St. Cloud, 702 F.Supp. at 1460
(concluding that because the defendant resided on a reservation,
benefitted from tribal programs, and was socially recognized as an Indian,
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he met the Rogers test for Indian stotus notvv'rthstanding the fact that he
1

was no longer enrolled or eligible for enrollment in any federally recognized
tribe).

8

While we decline to rest our decision on information contained in the
presentence investigation report, we note, that the report corroborates her
mother's testimony by listing two adult convictions in the Fort Peck Tribal
Court for disorderly conduct. Additionally, a reply brief filed in support of her
Rule 34 Motion to Arrest the Judgment charged that the government "failed
[its obligations under Brady v. Maryland] to disclose during the discovery
process that the defendant had been adjudicated in the Fort Peck Tribal
Court as an Indian." 373 U.S. 83, 83S.Ct. 7194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Indeed, the record reflects that the government's case agent and BIA
investigator was the Tribal Court judge who adjudicated Bruce as an
Indian. This very same investigator sat with counsel for the government
during the entire trial, quietly watching Bruce attempt to bring forward
evidence of her tribal recognition, without disclosing that the defendant had
been twice treated as an Indian in an Indian Tribal Court.

9

Bruce also presented evidence in a post-trial motion for arrest of judgment
brought pursuant to FED. R. C RIM. P. 34 that she was adjudicated as an
Indian child by a tribal court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2004). Because we conclude that the
evidence Bruce introduced at trial was sufficient to meet her burden of
production, we need not decide whether the additional evidence that Bruce
presented in her post-trial motions merits consideration.

,O

In addition, we note that harmless error analysis may find greater
justification when the prosecution has already met the more difficult task of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under§ 1153, which requires
proof of Indian status, rather than choosing to indict under§ 1152, which
effectively shifts the burden and cost of producing evidence of Indian status
to the defendant.

11

While the Fifth Amendment requires presentment or indictment by a grand
jury in felony cases, assault on a child under the age of sixteen, the crime
for which Bruce is charged, is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by one
year's imprisonment and/or a $100,000 fine, and, thus, does not implicate
this concern. We note, however, that of the remaining 13 crimes
enumerated in § 1153, at least 1O require indictment by a grand jury unless
waiver is obtained. Where indictment is required, the concern for avoiding
judicial usurpation by retroactively modifying indictments to conform to the
evidence established at trial is directly implicated.
In the present case, although Bruce did not have to be indicted by a
grand jury, the government nonetheless opted to proceed by grand jury
indictment. While the prosecution's choice to indict-because it was
merely optional-does not trigger our concern for safeguarding the
protective role of the grand jury, it does demonstrate that the error in the
indictment was easily correctable. Once her Indian status was
established, Bruce could have been recharged by Bill of Information,
without undue burden on the prosecution.
This is the only evidence in the record about Bruce's involvement with tribal
authorities. Bruce (quite properly) does not rely on anything else. While the
majority disclaims reliance on two arrests reported in the Presentence
Investigation Report, it nevertheless uses these incidents (both for
disorderly conduct for which the disposition was "forfeit bail") and an
argument made in a reply brief to bolster its position. Of course, neither
was in evidence before the district court when it found that Bruce had not
met her burden of production on the affirmative defense of her Indian
status, and should not be considered for any purpose on appeal. Even so,
these offenses show nothing pertinent because, for all we know, they are
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not even Bruce's and 'vve have no vvay of knowing whe'ther trtba! jurisdiction
was contested or conceded.
2
3

United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 4 How. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846).

See Keys. 103 F.3d at 761 (stating that lack of enrollment of two-year old
who had been treated as member of the tribe by the tribe and her parents
does not control determination of her Indian status); United States v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.1979) (upholding § 1153

indictment that charged defendant as an Indian against challenge that it
was deficient for failing also to charge that he was enrolled as enrollment is
not an "absolute requirement." nor necessarily determinative, when the
indictment adequately put the defendant on notice of his classification as
an Indian); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A
Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L.Rev. 503, 516 (1976).

The Eighth Circuit, which considers the determination of Indian or nonIndian status a conclusion of law, has broken the test into four factors
which are, in declining order of importance: "1) tribal enrollment; 2)
government recognition formally and informally through receipt of
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal
affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through residence on a
reservation and participation in Indian social life.'' United Stales

v.

Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150,152 (8th Cir.1995); see also United States

v.

Torres, 733 F.2d 449,456 (7th Cir.1984) (approving consideration of

whether a person is recognized as an Indian by an Indian tribe, or by the
federal government, and whether a person resides on an Indian reservation
and holds himself out as an Indian).
4

See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51

L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (noting that because§ 1153 does not apply to many
individuals who are racially to be classified as Indians, the government
offered proof that the defendants are enrolled members of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe and thus not emancipated from tribal relations; declining to
reach question whether nonenrolled Indians may ever be subject to §
1153); Lawrence. 51 F.3d at 152-54 (holding that alleged victim was nonIndian given that she was not an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe.
or any other tribe and wasn't eligible for enrollment because she had not
completed the requirements for tribal enrollment; the medical services she
had received from the Indian Health Service were not in her own right; the
fact that the Oglala Sioux Tribe had taken custody and placed the victim
under the care of her grandmother (an enrolled member) was too
insignificant an involvement to show tribal recognition as the victim was not
enrolled or eligible for enrollment; and she did not attend pow-wows, Indian
dances or other Indian cultural events and lived off-reservation except for a
brief period before she was abused); United States v. James, 980 F.2d
1314, 1319 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that facts conclusively proved that the
defendant and victim were enrolled Indians within the meaning of§ 1153):

United Sti:l/e.s v. Dodge. 538 F.2d 770, 786-87 (8th Cir.1976) (holding that
evidence of having filed an application for enrollment in the Yurok Tribe
and previous entry on the Pawnee tribal roll, and the fact that defendants
had held themselves out to be Indians within the meaning of§ 1153,
established Indian status under§ 1153); United States v. Heath. 509 F.2d
16, 19 (9th Cir.1974) (refusing to uphold federal jurisdiction over an
individual who was anthropologically a Klamath Indian after the Termination
Act ended his tribal affiliation); United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953
(9th Cir.1974) (stating, in dicta, that enrollment or lack of it is not
determinative of status as an Indian; the defendant had asked that his .
name be removed from the rolls of the Colville Tribe but it was not done);
Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30-32 (7th Cir.1938) (holding on habeas review
of a state court conviction that petitioner was Indian even though the
enrolling agent for the Bad River Reservation had refused to enroll him
because he belonged to the Lost Band of St. Croix Chippewas-an action
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which dldn t show that the petitioner was not Indian but rather, was
evidence that he was-and noting that he was the child of a full-blooded
Indian of the St. Croix Band of Lake Superior Chippewas and a father who
was a half-blood, had always resided on a reservation that was set aside
by treaty for the La Pointe Band and other Indians who might settle with
them. he maintained tribal relations with the Indians on the reservation and
was recognized as a Chippewa Indian by other Indians); Petition of
Carmen, 165 F .Supp. 942, 948 (N.D.Cal.1958) (finding no doubt that
petitioner is an Indian subject to the Major Crimes Act as he is an Indian by
blood and enrolled as a member of the Mono tribe), affd sub nom. Dickson
v. Carmen. 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1959); see also Halbert v. United States,
283 U.S. 753, 762-63, 51 S.Ct. 615, 75 L.Ed. 1389 (1931) (noting the
general rule that the right of individual Indians to share in tribal property
depends on tribal membership); Vezina

v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th

Cir.1917) (holding that person who was by blood of the Fond du Lac band
of the Chippewas of Lake Superior who moved to the reservation, was
recognized. enrolled, and secured allotments upon the reservation were
members).
5

As we observed in United States
Ci;.1979):

v. Jackson, 600 F_.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th

Section 1153 should be read in conjunction with § 1152, which
extends "the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of
offenses ... to the Indian country" with certain exceptions .... Thus, the
general rule is that "except for the offenses enumerated in (section
1153), all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians
within Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts."
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641. 643 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 1395.
1397, n. 2, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).
6

One circuit court (functioning as a trial court) found based on evidence of
custom and prior enrollment that one-eighth blood was sufficient to be
enrolled as a member of a particular tribe that the persons involved (who
were of mixed Indian blood) had chosen to identify themselves with, and to
be entitled to tribal benefits. Sully

v.

United States, 195 F. 113

(C.C.D.S.D.1912). Whether or not one-eighth blood is sufficient in some
cases, there is no evidence in this case that it would suffice for purposes of
membership in, or identification with, any relevant tribe.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF IDAHO
)
)
)

WILLIAM WOLFE,
Petitioner/Defendant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent/Plaintiff.

)
)

CASE NO.CR 1982-18920
ORDER DISMISSING MOTION

)
)
)
)
)
)

Mr. Wolf filed a Motion for Correction of Sentence pursuant to ICR 35 on June
17 1 2011.

Mr. Wolf previously filed a similar motion under ICR 35 in this case.

That motion was denied by the Honorable John Bradbury.
The petitioner is only permitted to file one (1) motion under ICR 35.
Therefore 1 the petitioner's second motion, filed June 17, 2011 is Dismissed.
So Ordered this 22 nd day of June, 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
)
William Wolfe,
)
Plaintiff(s),
) Case No. CR 82-18290
) CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
vs.
)
)
State of Idaho
)
Defendant(s).
.)
I, the undersigned, a Deputy Court Clerk of the above-entitled court, do
hereby certify that a copy of the Order Dismissing Motion filed in this case on June 22,
2011 was mailed or delivered by me on June 22, 2011 to:
William Wolfe#18593
I.S.C.I. 1 Unit 13C-68A
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
Attorney General's Office
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
State Appellate Public Defender
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703-6914
Idaho Supreme Court
Attn: Clerk
PO Box 83720
Boise1 ID 83720-0101
Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk
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State Appellate Public Defender
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SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY
STATE OF IDAHO,

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

~

Plaintiff~Respondent,

'

CASE NO. CR 1982-18290

)

V.

)
)

WILLIAM WOLFE,

~
)

Defendant-Appellant

S.C. DOCKET NO. 38896

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 416 W. MAIN
STREET, P.O. BOX 463, GRANGEVILLE, ID, 83530, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The

above-named

appellant

appeals

against

the

above-named

respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Dismissing Motion
entered in the above-entitled action on the 29th day of April, 2011, the Honorable
Michael

2.

J. Griffin, presiding.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 11 (c)(1-1 0).
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3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then

. intends to assert in the· appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are:
(a)

Did the district court err in determining that the interest in finality of
judgment prevented the court from determining whether the court
had subject matter jurisdiction in this case?

(b)

Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Wolfe's Rule 35 motion,
in which he asserted that his sentence was illegal because the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, had
previously been ruled upon by the district court?

(c)

Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Wolfe could not file a
second Rule 35 motion asserting that his sentence was illegal?

4.

No portions of the record have been sealed.

5.

Reporter's Transcript: The appellant does not request a transcript in this

case.

6.

Clerk's Record. The appellant requests a limited clerk's record pursuant

to I.AR. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included
in the clerk's record:
(a)

All documents filed in this case from December 2, 2004; to present,

including but not limited to all motions, orders, memorandums, affidavits, and
briefs;
(b)

The following documents contained in the district court record of

Idaho County Case Number CV-2005-36455, which were specifically cited in the
district court's order, which was then incorporated into the order on appeal in this
case, consisting of:
(i)

Memorandum Decision And Order, tiled October 26, 2006;
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(ii)

Affidavit of Wayne McGregor in Support of Respondent's

Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, filed August 11, 2005;
(iii)

Memorandum and Order, filed May 9, 2005;

(iv)

Affidavit of Brit Groom, including exhibits A through M, filed

January 12, 2006;
(v)

Petitioner's Exhibit C;

(vi)

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed February 11, 2005;

(vii)

Petitioner's

Memorandum

in

Support

of

Emergency/

Expedited Proceedings, filed February 11, 2005;
7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has not been served on the_
Court Reporter because a transcript has not been requested;

(b)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho
Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e));

(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a
criminal case (1.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 23(a)(8));

(d)

That arrangements have been made with Idaho County who will be
responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is
indigent, Idaho Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e);
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(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to I.AR 20.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of August, 2011, caused a
true and correct copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR
416 W MAIN STREET
PO BOX463
GRANGEVILLE ID 83530
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court

SBT/ns
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Jeff P. Payne
Attorney at Law
114 S. Idaho Avenue
Grangeville, ID 83530
Phone: (208) 983-0760
!SB# 3966

4

5

Attorney for: Respondent
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

7
8

WILLIAM WOLFE,

)
Case No. CV 05-36455
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF
) WAYNE C. MACGREGOR
)

9
10

Petitioner,
vs.

)
)

11

STATE OF IDAHO,
12
Respondent.

)
)
)

13
14

STATE OF IDAHO

15

County of Idaho

)
ss.
)

16

I, Wayne C. MacGregor, being first duly sworn depose and state that:

17

1. I am over the age of eighteen years;

18

2. I am a resident ofidaho County, State ofidaho;

19

3. I am an attorney currently licensed by the Idaho State Bar to practice law in the State of

20
21
22

Idaho, and have been since

/1, 5""J_

4. Since my admission to the Idaho State Bar in · /,s;}_

, I have been actively involved in

the practice of law;

23

5. During my career as an attorney I have acquired experience in many areas of the law,

24

including both criminal and civil law. During my career, I have been the Idaho County Prosecuting

25

Attorney, the Idaho County Public Defender, and have maintained a private practice.

26

6. In the 1980's I represented William Wolfe in a post-conviction relief proceeding following

27
28

AFFIDAVIT OF
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his 1982 conviction for First Degree Murder in Idaho County.

2

7. During the course ofmy representation of Mr. Wolfe, I reviewed the proceedings that led

3

to Mr. Wolfe's First Degree Murder conviction and presented what I believed to be Mr. Wolfe's most

4

meritorious post-conviction reliefissues during myrepresentation ofMr. Wolfe in the post-conviction

5

relief proceedings.

6

8. Issues presented in Mr. Wolfe's post-conviction relief proceeding included allegations of

7

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. I am not aware of any meritorious ineffective assistance of

8

counsel claims that were not raised in the post-conviction proceeding. Further, it is my belief that the

9

ineffective assistance of counsel claims that were raised were adequately presented during the post-

10

conviction proceeding.

11

9. In addition to the issues raised in the post-conviction relief proceeding, I considered other

12

potential issues that were not raised and presented. Such issues were not raised or presented because

13

I believed they lacked evidentiary support and/or merit.

14

10. One issue I specifically considered, but did not raise or present, was the issue of the Idaho

15

County District Court lackingjurisdiction over the offense under the theory that the Federal Court had

16

exclusive jurisdiction because the offense involved an Indian killed on an Indian reservation. I

17

considered and investigated the issue, but was unable to locate any admissible evidence to support the

18

allegation that the victim, Scott Gold was an Indian. I specifically recall that during my consideration

19

and investigation of the issue I contacted the Nez Perce Tribe and was advised the Mr. Gold was not

20

a Nez Perce Indian. I believe I also contacted other tribes in an effort to determine whether Mr. Gold

21

was an Indian, however, given the passage of time, I cannot recall specifically what other tribes I may

22

have contacted.

23
24
25

11. The information contained herein is true and accurate to the best of my recollection and
belief.

~

DATED this_.}_ day of August, 2005.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
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day of August, 2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS was
mailed by me by regular first class mail deposited in the U. S. Post Office at Grangeville, Idaho, this
-'-'-"---'--- day of August, 2005, to:
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Brit Groom
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 227
Cottonwood, ID 83522
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
WILLIA."1\1 WOLFE,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV 05-36455

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)

)
)

I. FACTS
On February 22, 1982, \Villiam Wolfe was charged with first degree murder in
the district court in Idaho County for killing Scott Gold outside the Silver Dollar Bar in
Stites. State v. Wolfe, No. 18290 (Idaho 2nd Dist. Ct. Feb. 22, 1982). Mr. Wolfe's
defense was that because he was so intoxicated at the time of the shooting, he was unable
to form the requite intent to commit first-degree murder. A jury found Mr. Wolfe guilty
and District Judge George Reinhardt imposed a fixed life sentence of imprisonment. On
direct appeal, Mr. Wolfe challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and
of an intention to murder with malice aforethought. He also contended his sentence was
excessive. The court affim1ed Mr. Wolfe's conviction and sentence on November 30,
1984. State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676 (Ct. App. 1984).
On August 11th, 1983, while the appeal was still pending and pursuant to Idaho's
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,§§ 19-4901 to 19-4909, Mr. Wolfe file a prose
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petition for post-conviction relief. In that petition Mr. Wolfe alleged 1) ineffective
assistance of counsel, 2) that he was entitled to a mistrial when jury members heard
testimony concerning the case outside the jury room, 3) that the court abused its
discretion in refusing to sequester the jury in light of the extensive media coverage of the
trial, 4) the state's use of perjured testimony, 5) the use of Jim Fletcher as an expert
witness, and 6) the state's use of Jim Fletcher in rebuttal of the defense's expert witness.
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Case No. 18290. On Aug 18, 19 83 Judge Reinhardt
appointed counsel to assist Mr. Wolfe with his petition. State v. Wolfe, 113 Idaho 337,
338 (Ct. App. 1987). On November 15\ 1984, Mr. Wolfe was transported to the Idaho
County Courthouse for a hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Id. At the
hearing Mr. Wolfe's counsel also moved for reduction of the sentence pursuant to Rule
35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Wolfe and counsel focused on a
reduction of the sentence rather than on the allegations of his post-conviction relief
petition. Id.
On February 13, 1985, Judge Reinhardt held that the conviction of Mr. Wolfe for
first degree murder did not violate federal or state constitutions. He also found that Mr.
vVolfe received a fair trial and was afforded due process throughout all proceeding. He
denied the post-conviction petition and the motion for reduction of sentence.

Mr. Wolfe filed a second petition for post-conviction relief on July I, 1985.
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Case No. 18290B. That petition alleged 1) that Mr.
Wolfe's counsel failed to investigate the previous prose petition therefore violating his
rights to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 2) that failure to investigate, deprived him of his
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right to liberty without due process oflaw, and 3) that on May 20, 1982Judge Reinhardt
prejudiced the jury by making statements in the Lewiston Tribune before the jury started
deliberating on the evidence presented at trial. Id.
On March 3, 1986, Judge Reinhardt granted the state's motion to dismiss Mr.
Wolfe's second post-conviction relief petition (Case No. 18290B). He found that Mr.
Wolfe's petition had not made a factual showing that entitled him to relief. On March 10,
1986, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Case No. 18290B) which
Judge Reinhardt denied on April 17, 1986. Mr. Wolfe then appealed case no. 18290B.
On September 9, 1987, the court of appeals decided Mr. Wolfe's PostConviction Relief Petition's 18290 and 18290B. State v. Wolfe, 113 Idaho 337 (Ct. App.
,•

1987). The court concluded that Mr. Wolfe raised issues in his application that required
an evidentiary hearing. Id at 341. It found that Mr. Wolfe's second application, together
with its incorporation of the first application, raised genuine issues of fact concerning the
use of allegedly perjured testimony from a witness and on allegations of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel through failure to call certain witnesses. Id. The case was
therefore remanded for a hearing. Id.
Judge Reinhardt appointed Wayne MacGregor to represent Mr. Wolfe on March
1, 1988 and May 13, 1988 and then held hearings on the remand. Mr. MacGregor argued
for a reduction in his sentence, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial
court abused its discretion in personally examining two witnesses and in denying his
motion for summary disposition. In addition, Mr. MacGregor investigated the issue of
the court's jurisdiction over Mr. Wolfe's offense under the theory that the federal court
had exclusive jurisdiction because the offense involved an Indian killed on an Indian
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Reservation. Affidavit of Wayne MacGregor in support of Respondent's Motion for

Summary Dismissal of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 2 . Mr. MacGregor
contacted the Nez Perce Tribe and was told that the victim was not a member of the
Tribe. Mr. MacGregor contacted other tribes but was unable to procure any evidence of
the victim's affiliation with another Indian tribe. Given that, he did not object to the
court's jurisdiction. Id.
On August 26, 1988 Judge Reinhardt denied the petition. He held that: 1) Mr.
Wolfe's conviction and sentence were not in violation of the Constitution of the United
States of the State ofldaho, 2) there was no evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that required vacation of Mr. Wolfe's conviction and sentence, and
3) trial counsel's representation of Mr. Wolfe was neither inadequate nor incompetent
and Mr. Wolfe's right to counsel was not infringed. Mr. Wolfe filed a timely appeal.
The court of appeals affirmed Judge Reinhardt's decision in March of 1990. Wolfe v.

State, 117 Idaho 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1990).
On March 19, 1999, Mr. Wolfe filed a prose Motion for Clarification of
Sentence. On May 5, 1999, Judge Reinhardt denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion for Clarification
finding that the sentence was not illegally imposed under Idaho Code§ 19-2513A.
On Dec 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a prose Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an
Illegal Sentence. In his motion, Mr. Wolfe requested that I take judicial notice that; 1)
that the victim was an Indian and member of the Nez Perce Tribe, 2) that the crime
alleged occurred in Stites, Idaho, within the boundaries of a known Indian reservation, 3)
that the prosecution never obtained any consent to act on behalf of the Nez Perce Tribal
authorities, 4) that the crime of murder for which Mr. Wolfe was convicted is exclusively
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under law of the United States, 5) and that Mr. Wolfe's sentence is illegal. On December
14, 2004, I summarily denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion for Relief pursuant to Criminal Rule
35 without reaching the merits because it was untimely. On December 27, 2004, Mr.
Wolfe filed a Motion to Reconsider for LR. C.P. 60 (b) Relief alleging that an illegal
sentence can be corrected.at any time.
On February 11, 2005, Mr. Wolfe filed his third petition for post-conviction relief.
In that petition he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel alleging his lawyer's failure to
inform him of the court's lack of jurisdiction in a case involving the alleged murder of an
Indian on the Nez-Perce Indian Reservation. He alleged that the federal courts have
exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes committed against Indians on an Indian
reservation by virtue of the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. He also filed a
Notice of Error, Objection and Request for Relief giving notice that the crime Mr. Wolfe
was convicted of fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court and objected
that the complaint and information filed against him failed to indicate that this court had
jurisdiction, and that he did not have access to Idaho courts or maps. He also filed a
Motion for Expedited or Emergency Proceedings requesting counsel and alleging: I)
unlawfulness of judgment and conviction, 2) denial of a speedy trial and, 3) prejudice
created by pre-indictment incarceration.
On May 9, 2005, I issued a Memorandum and Order addressing Mr. Wolfe's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. I held that Mr. Wolfe's argument that the state did
not have jurisdiction to convict him of murder had merit under the Indian Major Crimes
Act. I requested both parties and the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs regarding the
jurisdiction issue. The Tribe did not file a brief. On February 16, 2006 I issued an Order
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to Produce Military Records, and on May 11, 2006 I issued an Order to Produce Medical
Records held by the Nez Perce Tribal Medical Facilities, both relating to Scott Gold to
determine ifhe was a member of an Indian tribe. The military records of Mr. Gold along
with a letter from the Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Nation and revealed that he
was of Native American descent and the Nez Perce Tribal medical records revealed that
he was one-half Blackfoot Indian and therefore eligible to receive medical services from
the Nez Perce Clinic. See Exhibits A through M to the Affidavit ofBrit Groom;

Petitioner's Exhibit C.. The parties' arguments are outlined below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the untimeliness of a petition for post-conviction relief should be
excused because the convicting court was without subject matter jurisdiction appears to
be a matter of first impression in Idaho. Interests in the finality of a court's judgment
must be weighed with the concept of fundamental fairness.

An action for post-conviction relief is civil in nature and is governed by the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,591 (Ct.App.1993); Pizzuto v.

State, 127 Idaho 469,470 (1995). Such an action may be summarily dismissed either on
the state's motion or upon the comi's own initiative if the applicant's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact, which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle
him to the requested relief. I.C. § 19-4906; Medrano v. State, 127 Idaho 639, 643
(Ct.App.1995); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,761 (Ct.App.1991). For purposes of
considering a summary dismissal motion an applicant's uncontroverted factual allegations
contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits are
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deemed to be true. Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 904 (Ct.App.1995); Roman v. State,
125 Idaho 644,647 (Ct.App.l994);Ramirezv. State, 113 Idaho 87, 88 (Ct.App.1987).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel an applicant must show
that the lawyer's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Berg

v. State, 131 Idaho 517,520 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316 (Ct.App.1995);
Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if
the applicant shows that the representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988);

Russell, 118 Idaho at 67. To establish prejudice the applicant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for the lawyer's deficient performance, the outcome of the criminal
case would have been different. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761;

Russell, 118 Idaho at 67.
III. CONTENTIONS
1. Mr. Wolfe contends:
A. The victim, Scott Gold, was Native American and that the alleged
crime of murder occurred on the Nez Perce Indian Reservation and
that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to try him for
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1153, grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his
offense.

B. The untimeliness of his petition should be excused because; 1) he was
held out ofldaho State without access to any maps of the Nez Perce
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Indian Reservation and, 2) a strict application of the time bar would
work an injustice on the fundamental concept of justice.
C. Because his counsel at the post-conviction hearing failed to object to
the court's lack of jurisdiction, Mr. Wolfe did not have effective
assistance of counsel.
D. This court should consider his petition under Idaho's Habeas Corpus
Statute as well as the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
2. The State ofldaho argues for summary dismissal of Mr. Wolfe's postconviction relief petition on the grounds that:
A. Mr. Wolfe's petition for post-conviction relief was not timely filed.

B. Mr. Wolfe's petition is barred as a successive petition for postconviction relief.
C. Mr. Wolfe's allegations in support of his petition for post-conviction
relief are bare and conclusory and do not raise a genuine issue of
material fact. Specifically, that Mr. Wolfe has only submitted evidence
that the victim in this case is an enrolled member the Blackfoot Tribe
but fails to support the allegations that the crime occurred on the Nez
Perce Reservation.
D. Mr. Wolfe's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are bare
and conclusory and do not raise issues of material fact. Specifically,
that counsel for Mr. Wolfe considered raising an objection to
jurisdiction but after investigation determined that the issues lack
evidentiary support and merit.
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E. This court does not have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Wolfe's request
for habeas corpus relief.
IV. DISCUSSION

l. Claim of Jurisdictional Error
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), I.C. § 19-4901 et seq.,
provides a mechanism for considering a variety of claims that could not be raised in trial
or on direct appeal. The Act is available "to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial
which affect either the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the judgment." Maxfield

v. State, 108 Idaho 493,499 (Ct.App.1985), (quoting Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 47475 (1971)). Mr. Wolfe alleges that a state court does not have jurisdiction to convict or
sentence him and I.C. § 19-4901 is the proper avenue to claim a jurisdictional error.
2. Timeliness of Mr. Wolfe's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

a. Constitutionality of a One Year Limit
Under the UPCPA, LC. § 19-4902, an application for post-conviction relief"may
be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from
the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an
appeal, whichever is later." In Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390 (1996), the court held
that the imposition of a one-year limit on a defendant's right to file an application for
post-conviction relief did not violate the defendant's right to due process oflaw. 1 This
holding was later followed in Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530 (Ct. App. 1997). In that
case Mr. Martinez argued that the one-year limitation period provided by LC. § 19-4902
unconstitutionally infringed on his right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

A 1993 amendment shortened the time period from five years to one year. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.
265 § 1, at 898.
1
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States Constitution and Aliicle I,§ 13, of the Idaho Constitution. Id at 131. In
dismissing Mr. Martinez's claim, the court opined that "the one-year limitation period
provides prisoners a reasonable amount of time within which to file their applications for
post-conviction relief." Id at 132. Indeed, the court in Hanks v. State, 121 Idaho 153,
154 (Ct. App. 1992), concluded that "a reading of this statute [I.C. § 19-4902] clearly
reveals the legislature's intent to make the time period for bringing an application for
post-conviction relief limited by the time period in which the applicant could have
perfected a direct appeal."

b. Fundamental Justice
Mr. Wolfe argues that "a strict application of [the] time bar would result in
manifest injustice and is inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice." Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief at 4. Mr. Wolfe cites Lafon v. State, 119 Idaho 387 (Ct. App.
1991) and Olds v. State, 122 Idaho 976 (Ct. App. 1992) to support that proposition.
In Lafon, the petitioner pled guilty to a charge of first degree murder and was
sentenced to an indeterminate term oflife in prison. 119 Idaho at 388. On November .16,
1987, nine years later, LaFon filed a prose application for post-conviction relief, asking
that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. One ofLaFon's allegations was that
his guilty plea was not knowingly entered because the sentence imposed upon him by the
district court was altered by the Commission for Pardons and Parole (Commission). Id.
The Commission, as a result of policy changes, decided in 1986 that Lafon was not
eligible for parole; LaFon was not aware of the detrimental effect the changed policy
would have on his parole eligibility until the 1986 decision. Id.
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The court of appeals acknowledged the district court's finding that "a strict
application of the five-year limitation would have the effect of depriving LaFon of his
claim under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act before the claim actually arose;
and that such a result would be "manifestly unjust" and "inconsistent with the concept of
fundamental justice." Id at 390 n.5. The state did not challenge the district court's
application of a discovery exception to this category which effectively allowed LaFon to
file a petition for post-conviction relief well past the time allowed by statute. 2 In fact, the
state in that case agreed that the discovery exception was applied properly. Id.
The Lafon case differs significantly from the case at hand. Mr. Lafon's claim for
post-conviction relief was only ripe once the Commission had made its ruling on Mr.
Lafon's eligibility for parole. Mr. Lafon could not have known that the Commission was
going to modify its parole eligibility requirements until it did so in 1986. The
disadvantage arose only after the Commission acted. Due to these circumstances the
state and district court agreed to allow Mr. Lafon, to submit a statutorily untimely petition
for post-conviction relief.
In Mr. Wolfe's case, the issue of jurisdiction has been ripe for challenge this
case's inception. There have been no allegations that a change of policy or rules is the
root cause of Mr. Wolfe's untimely petition. Lafon is inapposite.
Mr. Wolfe also cites Olds, 122 Idaho 976, for the proposition that a challenge to
unlawful commitment can be brought any time. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.
The court in that case affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Mr. Olds' postconviction petition. Id at 316. The court held that the appropriate method for a challenge
to Mr. Olds' unlawful commitment or confinement was a writ of habeas corpus which
2

The discovery exception doctrine will be further addressed below.
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may be brought at any time and is exempt from the time constraints which postconviction petitions are subject. Id at 315. The Olds case is also inapposite.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to a motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative.
The current petition for post-conviction relief was filed on February 11, 2005, over
twenty years after the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for postconviction relief. The failure to file a timely petition is a basis for its dismissal.

Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189 (2001). Absent some evidence that the ~tatute of
limitations was tolled, the current petition for post-conviction relief is untimely.

3. Equitable Tolling
a. Access to Idaho Legal Materials
Equitable tolling of the statute oflimitations for filing a post-conviction relief
petition is recognized in two situations. One is where a petitioner was incarcerated in an
out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to
Idaho legal materials. See Martinez v. State,

130 Idaho 530,536 (Ct.App.1997) rev.

denied (October 6, 1997), (where an inmate is denied access to Idaho courts, the
limitation period for filing a UPCP A may be tolled until inmate gains ability to access the
court).

In Martinez the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief submitted evidence
indicating that after his conviction he was housed in a California penal institution without
access to Idaho legal materials and without appointed counsel. Id at 133. The court held
that Martinez had made a "prima facie showing that he was deprived of meaningful
access to Idaho courts, to which he was entitled under Art. I,§ 18 of the Idaho
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Constitution, during his incarceration in California." Id. The court further reasoned that
in order to "prevent prejudice to Martinez from this abridgement of his access to Idaho
courts, we are constrained to hold that, if Martinez were to sustain his burden of proving
such abridgement at an evidentiary hearing, the limitation period for his post-conviction
action would be deemed tolled until Martinez was afforded access to Idaho courts
through his retained counsel." Id.
Mr. Wolfe claims that he has not been allowed access to maps while incarcerated
by the Idaho Department of Corrections (I.D.O.C.). He has failed to submit any evidence
of how an I.D.O.C. rule prohibiting inmates from access to maps has in any way hindered
his ability to investigate claims that this court may have been without jurisdiction to try
and convict him. Mr. Wolfe has had over twenty years, with the benefit of appointed
counsel, to raise a claim regarding the jurisdiction of this court. In fact, Mr. Wolfe was
approached by a paralegal friend "on or about the end of2004" who raised the issue of
exclusive federal jurisdiction on Indian reservations. Petitioner's Memorandum in
Support ofEmergency/Expedited Proceedings at 2. It was only after this conversation
that the I.D.O.C. policy regarding maps became an issue. Therefore, the theory of
equitable tolling due to a denial of access to the Idaho courts does not apply here.

Mr. Wolfe also contends that a discovery exception to the time limits for filing an
application for post-conviction relief should apply. The discovery exception doctrine in
the post-conviction context allows an applicant additional time in which to file a petition
for relief after discovery of new evidence. He argues that he was denied access to maps
while detained and therefore, was unable to determine if the Silver Dollar Bar at Stites
was within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation.
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The Idaho appellate courts have never squarely decided whether a discovery
exception may be engrafted onto the limitation period of I.C. § 19-4901. See Martinez,
130 Idaho at 537; Chapman v. State, 128 Idaho 733, 735 (Ct. App. 1996). In Housley v.

State, 119 Idaho 885, 888 (Ct.App.1991), the court argued that a discovery exception to
I.C. § 19-4902 "may have merit in some cases." However, the court did not address the
merits of Mr. Housley's argument because the record disallowed the applicant's
allegation of late discovery of the facts upon which he based his claim for relief Id.
Assuming a discovery exception is available in Idaho, it does not help Mr. Wolfe.
The boundaries of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation were established by the treaty of
1855 and have been a matter of public record ever since. The allegation that he just
recently discovered that Stites was within the Reservation and that the court's jurisdiction
was an is~ue is disingenuous. The issue of whether Mr. Gold was a Native American was
investigated by Wayne MacGregor in the 1980's. Inquires to the Nez Perce Tribe and
other tribes disclosed no useful information. The explicit purpose of that inquiry was that
if Mr. Gold were Native American, the court's jurisdiction could be questioned. The
predicate necessary for such an inquiry is that the offense occurred within the boundaries
of the Reservation. This issue of jurisdiction preemption was discussed and not pursued3
because there was no evidence that Mr. Gold was Native American. Accordingly, the
alleged fact of the offense occurring on the Reservation is not newly discovered and the
discovery exception does not apply.

b. Mentallncompetency
The second situation that warrants tolling of the one year limit is when mental
disease and/or psychotropic medication render a petitioner incompetent and prevent him
3

Mr. MacGregor's failure to object to this court's jurisdiction is further addressed below.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

14

0003

from pursuing a timely challenge to his conviction. See Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381,
385 (Ct.App.1996). The Abbott court said:
Abbott's assertion that mental disease or psychotropic medication rendered him
incompetent and prevented him from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction
are sufficient to raise factual issues and intertwining legal issues as to whether he
was prevented from timely filing his action by mental incapacity or medication,
whether strict application of the one-year statute oflimitation would deprive
Abbott of any meaningful opportunity to present his claims for post-conviction
relief, and whether the statute of limitation should be deemed tolled in such
circumstance to avoid violation of constitutional due process guarantees.
See also Isaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369, 370 n. 1 (Ct.App.1999).
Mr. Wolfe has never alleged he suffered from any mental disease or that
psychotropic medication rendered him incompetent and therefore prevented him from
earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction.
c. · "Extraordinary Circumstances"

In 2005 the court, in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579 (Ct. App. 2005),
recognized that "[o]ther courts have adopted ap_ "extraordinary circumstances" or "rare
and exceptional circumstances" standard for determining when the statute of limitation
for a post-conviction or habeas corpus action is equitably tolled." Id., quoting Laws v.
Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Where a habeas petitioner's mental
incompetence in fact caused him to fail to meet the ... filing deadline, his delay was
caused by an 'extraordinary circumstance beyond [his] control,' and the deadline should
be equitably tolled."); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3 rd Cir. 2001) (remanding for

MEMORA1\TDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

15

0003 3

evidentiary hearing to determine whether habeas petitioner's mental health problems
constituted extraordinary circumstances, such as uncontrollable circumstances which
prevent a petitioner from timely filing, and excusable neglect is insufficient); Smith v.

McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2

nd

Cir. 2000) (in order for equitable tolling to apply, habeas

petitioner must show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his
petition on time, and that he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he
seeks to toll).
The Ninth Circuit has also applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to postconviction petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In Spitsyn v. Moore, 345
th

F.3d 796, 798 (9 Circuit 2003), the court tolled the one year statute of limitation for
filing a habeas petition due to the "extraordinary circumstance" of egregious misconduct
on the part of the petitioner's counsel. In Spitsyn, a state prisoner's mother hired a lawyer
almost a full year before his habeas filing deadline. After months of inactivity, Spitsyn
and his mother wrote to the lawyer, but received no response. As the filing deadline
approached, Spitsyn and his mother contacted the state bar association seeking assistance.
Spitsyn also sent his lawyer another letter asking for his file. The lawyer did not respond
to any of these letters before the filing deadline passed. Finally, after the deadline, the
lawyer sent a letter "expressing regret for not following through with the case and
returning the Spitsyns' payment." Months later, the lawyer returned Spitsyn's file.
Spitsyn then filed a pro se habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that "the misconduct of Spitsyn' s lawyer
was sufficiently egregious to justify equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period ... "

Id at 801. The court has also decided that a one year statute of limitation for filing for

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

16

900390

,post-conviction relief may be equitably tolled if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a
prisoners control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Brambles v. Duncan, 330
F.3d 1197, 1201 (9 th Cir. 2003), amended in other respects by 342 F.3d 898 (9 th Cir.
2003).
In Bryant v. St.ate ofIdaho, 79 Fed. Appx. 257, 258 (9 th Cir. 2003), the petitioner
claimed that his "prison transfers, the inadequacy of the prison libraries, his counsel's late
notification of the finality of appeal, and his counsel's failure to inform him of the
AE.D.P.A. [The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] limitation"
constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. The court of appeals
held that, while it has recognized prison transfers and inadequate prison libraries as
grounds for granting equitable tolling, the inquiry is "highly fact dependant." Id. citing
Lott v. Mueller 304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir.2000) (en bane)). The petitioner in the Bryant case failed to allege specific
facts proving that the transfers or the insufficient library holdings affected his ability to
file on time. Id. Similarly, the court found that Mr. Bryant's two other claims alleging
misconduct on the part of his counsel were negligent, not rising to the level of
"egregious", and therefore did not constitute extraordinary circumstances. Id at 258-259;
see also Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1106 (9th Cir.2002); Frye v. Hickman, 273
F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001); cf. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 796.
Wolfe has not submitted evidence demonstrating that any "extraordinary
circumstance" prevented him from filing a petition on time or that he acted with
reasonable diligence throughout the period he was seeking to toll. Wayne MacGregor,
Mr. Wolfe's counsel for the first and second post-conviction petitions, avers that he
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considered but rejected making an objection to this court's lack of jurisdiction. Affidavit

of Wayne MacGregor at 2. While Mr. Wolfe's present counsel has found evidence that
Mr. Gold was Native American, it was an arduous and expensive undertaking. That fact
does not detract from Mr. MacGregor's work. The standard is not what is possible. It is
what is reasonable. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520. I find.and conclude that Mr. MacGregor's
inquiry and advice regarding jurisdiction was reasonable.

4. The Court's Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The evidence now available persuades me that there is a genuine issue of whether
the court had had jurisdiction because there is credible admissible evidence that Mr. Gold
was in fact a Native American. It is important to note, however, that that evidence
merely puts the issue in play. There are other issues that would have to be resolved
before a conclusion about jurisdiction could be drawn. See, e.g., South Dakota v.

Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1994);
Solem v. Barlett, 465 U.S. 463,466 (1984); Seymore v. Superintendent of Wash. State
Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351,354 (1962); United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1129-30
(9 th Cir. 2000).
That squarely presents the difficult issue of whether or not jurisdiction can be
raised at any time regardless of statutory or equitable constraints. That issue puts in stark
relief the tension between two fundamental but competing legal precepts: the court's
power to act and the need for finality of judgments. That gives rise to a paradox.
Judgments by a court without jurisdiction are void. State, Dept. ofHealth and Welfare v.

Housel, 140 Idaho 96 (2004); State v. Battens, 137 Idaho 730, (Ct. App. 2002). Finality
assumes the existence of a judgment.
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The applicable statutes come down on the side of finality. The UPCP A permits a
person who has been convicted or sentenced for a crime to have judicial review of a
claim that "the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence" or that there were
"material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the sentence
in the interest of justice." I.C. § 19-4901(2) & (4). The Act grants the applicant the right
to petition for review "within one (1) year :from the expiration of the time for appeal or
:from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of an appeal or :from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." LC. § 19-4902
(a). The Act unambiguously contemplates that the absence of jurisdiction can occur and
that if it is not raised within the prescribed time limits a remedy is not available.
Criminal Rule 12(b)(2) imposes comparable constraints. It provides that
objections or defenses to the complaint, indictment, or information can be raise1 only
"during the pendency of the proceedings." The offense occurred in 1982. The trial was
held in 1982. The third and final appeal was decided in 1990. No matter how
"proceedings" is defined, they are long over.
There is a dearth of authority on this issue. The U.S. District Court in North
Carolina held that the interests in finality trump jurisdiction. Jones v. State of South

Carolina, 2005 WL 2837537, slip op at 2 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2005). While it is logically
difficult to give finality to a judgment that may be void, the equities of this case argue
that applying that precedent to Mr. Wolfe is fair.
None of the three appeals found the fairness of the trial wanting. There has been
no evidence presented that Mr. Wolfe did not murder Mr. Gold. Twenty-four years have
elapsed since the offense was committed. Sixteen years have elapsed since the last
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appeal was decided. The evidence is overwhelming that he was effectively represented
during that entire process. There is nothing fundamentally unfair about applying the
UPCPA as it is written because Mr. Wolfe received the process he was due.

5. Habeas Petition

In addition to the request for relief under the UPCP A, Mr. Wolfe requests that the
court "consider the whole of this petition as done via Idaho's Habeas Corpus Statute§
19-4201 et seq." (See Petition for Post-Conviction Relief). However, under I.C. § 194202, original jurisdiction for habeas petitions resides in the supreme court and the
district court of the county in which the person is detained. Mr. Wolfe is currently
detained in Ada County. Therefore, the Idaho County district court does not have
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Wolfe's petition for habeas corpus relief.
Having had the benefit of extensive briefing and upon further reflection, I
conclude my Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 9, 2005, in this case was
improvident and should be vacated.
V.ORDER
1. The Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 9, 2005 is VACATED
2. This court ADVISES all parties to this action of its intention to dismiss the Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. As required by Idaho Code § l 9-4906(b) you are notified that
you have 20 days in which to respond to the PROPOSED DISMISSAL.
.:,....:,.:;.,..-

./

It is so ordered this ..::.:l(rJ day of October, 2006.

,,,,-·-1
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Y Johri"'H. Bradbury
District Judge
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following:
·
Jeff P. Payne
Attorney at Law
114 S. Idaho Avenue
Grangeville, ID 83530
Brit Groom
Attorney at Law
P.O.Box227
Cottonwood, ID 83522
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Brit D. Groom
Brit Groom, Chtd.
504 King Street, Suite 1

P.O. Box 227
Cottonwood, Idaho 83522
Telephone No.: (208) 962-7229
ISBN 3968

Attorney for the Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
WILLIAM WOLFE,
Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO. CV-05-36455

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIT GROOM

)
vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Defendant.

)
)

COMES NOW t BRIT GROOM, being duly sworn on oath, and deposes
and says:
1) That my name is Brit Groom;

2) That I represent the above-named Plaintiff;
3) That a Motion For Extension Of Time To File Responsive Pleadings is
filed herewith;
4) That the opposing party in this matter is not prejudice by this Motion
because the Plaintiff remains in custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections
AFFIDAV17' OF BRIT GROOM

1

,, '.
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during the pendency of these actions;
5) That a Responsive Pleading was due on December 16, 2005, pursuant to

the Court's earlier Order;

6) However, due to a clerical error, I had the due date listed as January 16,
2006;
7) That I have contacted the Idaho State Tax Commission to request tax
records for Scott Gold. The Commission is in the process of determining how I

may access Mr. Gold's tax records (Subpoena, Court Order, etc.);
8) That I have written a second letter to the Marine Corps National

Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri, requesting record information
on Scott Gold. A true and correct copy is attached hereto as "Exhibit A". A
true and correct copy of my initial letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit B" for the

Court's reference;
9) A recent telephone conversation with Personnel at the Records Center in
St. Louis indicated an estimated 30-45 days of additional time necess.ary to
process my request.

'71'r
-'
DATED this /;), day of January, 2 0 0 6 . \ ~ - - -

~~
Plaintiff's Attorney

00039":
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SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me on this

/J~ay of January, 2006.

fJMv~

ERIN BLINN
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public in and for Idaho
Residing at: Grct.11£:fWtlle.-.
My Commission expires:

m/ct/;K)tl

(SEAL)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ a y of January, 2006, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the individual listed below by handdelivering the same to the attorney's court box at the Idaho County Courthouse in

Grangeville, Idaho.
Mr. Jeff Payne
Attorney
Idaho County Courthouse
Grangeville, Idaho 83530

~-r
Brit Grdfun

Attorney for the Plaintiff
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BRIT D. GROOM
LAWYER

504 King St., Suite 1
POBox.227
Cottonwood, Idaho 83522

January 2, 2006
Director, National Personnel Records Center
Military Personnel Records Branch
9700 Page Ave.
St. Louis, Missouri 63132-5295

RE: Scott Gold, NPRC Registration No. N5026945

Dear Sfr or Madam:

~~----.

I am writing to inquire about your response to~:) .er~·,: @:~~~ber 1, 2005.
Enclosed, you will find that letter, and I would apprecfuie·'y ~'.telllonse {q my requests in this
matter as soon as possible. Please call me if you have any questions or cbhcems. Thank you.
Sincerely yours,

Brit Groom

BG;eb
Enclosure

?fl-l?-Ot.?.-7?.?.Q Tt>.l.

:Email: groomlawJ@yahoo.com

208-962-7128 Fax.

£)(!-/ I BIT /3
BRIT D. GROOM
LAWYER
504 King St., Suite 1
POBox227

Cottonwood, Idaho 83522

December 1, 2005
Director, National Personnel Records Center
Military Personnel Records Branch
9700 Page Ave.
St. Louis, Missouri 63132~5295
Re: Scott Gold, NPRC Registration No. N5026945

Dear Sir or Madam:
My name is Brit Groom, and I am the attorney appointed to represent Mr. William
Wolfe. A copy of my appointment is enclosed.
/;::,',. .
On August 5, 1982, Mr. Wolfe was sentenced for the ~rcte@"w®\~d. A
copy of Mr. Gold's obituary is enclosed.
\ ~ ~1/
ii
Recent developments indicate that Mr. Gold was a Native American. Iftbii is correct,
then Mr. Wolfe was wrongfully convicted, as the l.ocal Idaho State Court had no jurisdiction
over the case.
Previously, I had conracted Ms. Teresa D. Ross at Headquarters Marine Corp. She
told me that I need ro contact your office and request a copy of Mr. Gold's official military
personnel file (OMPF). I am doing so at this time.
The attachments hereto should be sufficient to show "proof of death" of Mr. Gold. If
they are not, please let me know.
Thank you in advance for you assistance in this matter.

fF:

Sincerely yours,

/~----~--~-,--.
L~~</7·

~-,:;:,

Brit/,Groom · ./4'
BG:eb

/,,.-

En.closures

208-962-7229 Tel.

Email: !lroomlawl@vahoo.com

208-962-7128 Fax,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
State of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Supreme Court No. 38896-2011
Idaho County No. CR 82-18290

vs.

William Wolfe,
Defendant/Appellant.
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Idaho Appellate Rules.
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